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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis poses the question of how NATO can prevail against Russian 
propaganda that aims to undermine the alliance that has defended Europe for nearly 75 
years. Particular attention is devoted to the visual element of propaganda found in 
posters, photomontages, drawings, and film used by the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War in its campaign against NATO, and more recently by the Russian Federation in its 
multi-faceted assault on the hearts and minds of Europe. The thesis analyzes these 
phenomena in the context of studies by scholars Jo Fox and Peter Paret on how conflict 
has been portrayed in art and film. The thesis argues that Russian propaganda has its 
antecedents in the Soviet campaign and that NATO has countered Russian propaganda. 
The thesis compares NATO’s response to Soviet propaganda during the Cold War to 
NATO’s more recent efforts to counter Russian propaganda, notably the establishment of 
the Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Case studies examine the use of 
propaganda and public information by both Russia and NATO relating to Zapad 2017 
and Trident Juncture 2018. The thesis concludes with recommendations on ways in 
which NATO can prevail in this critical battle for influence and enhance its effectiveness. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The world of 2020 lives in awe of the terms hybrid war and great power 
competition. Much hyperbole and little sound analysis adheres to these terms. This study 
works on aspects of these terms, especially in the case of Eastern Europe and the categories 
of Clausewitz’s theory that deal with politics and psychology as facets of the nature of war 
and the attempt to give it some coherence.  
In particular, since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia has used a 
combination of coercive diplomacy, nationalism, limited military force and, above all, an 
all-horizons campaign of propaganda in various media. This strategy has targeted not just 
Ukraine, the ex-USSR republic under the eye of Putin’s Eurasian revanchism, but also 
targeted North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and partner states in order to 
disrupt, sow discord, and undermine trust in NATO. For the U.S. Navy and other forces 
participating in NATO exercises, Russia’s use of propaganda is a form of aggression 
presenting a challenge that defies normal categories of naval tactics and operations. This 
phenomenon cries out for analysis, which is the goal of this study. The contemporary naval 
officer on service under the barrage of this offensive has to be able to recognize Russian 
strategic and operational coercion and subterfuge when it arises, but more so, it is the 
response by those enjoined to defend the North Atlantic alliance and beyond to this Russian 
propaganda that matters. 
Such comprehension as a guide to policy, strategy, and operations is central to 
deterrence and possible victory in various levels of warfare of the non-shooting and 
shooting kind across the spectrum of conflict. This study takes this startling effort as its 
focus and, in turn, seeks to answer how has NATO public information and efforts at mass 
persuasion countered Russian propaganda and psychological operations in what is 
described as hybrid war? In addition, how has the answer to Russian aggression bolstered 
the Alliance, and supported NATO’s strategy to deter Russian revanchism? Lastly, the 
thesis seeks to discover what generalizations are possible for the making of strategy for 
 2 
crisis and operations short of conflict in the realm of propaganda and to offer suggestions 
for application in policy and operations.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The use and importance of propaganda to influence opponents and allies before, 
during, and after war is an old theme of war and psychology that a new generation is 
compelled to rediscover amid shock at Russian deftness in this realm. As French 
philosopher Jacques Ellul said, “Before the war, propaganda is a substitute for physical 
violence; during the war, it is a supplement to it.”0F1 As scholar Jo Fox notes, “propaganda 
was inescapable for the modern state.”1F2 From the rise of the modern political era in the 
wars of religion in Europe and the French Revolution, the role of mass persuasion became 
an element of Russian statecraft in the attempt by Russia to influence the fate of Europe in 
the realm of ideas and opinion. This process was especially present in Metternich’s Europe 
and the Congress system. 2F3 During World War One and World War Two, all the belligerents 
utilized various forms of propaganda to mobilize their populations and influence enemies 
and neutrals. Fox writes that the concept of Total War,  that is, a war of society and 
economy over and above a navy at sea or an army in the field, introduced in World War 
One and repeated in World War Two and the Cold War, necessitated mass psychological 
mobilization in order to convince populations of the “necessity of the fight and the 
endurance required to win it.” 3F4 While nuclear weapons did or did not deter actual combat 
in the epoch 1945–1991, propaganda on a global front and forms of violence at a low to 
intermediate level were a central battlefield in the Soviet–U.S. antagonism. The Soviet 
Union, the United States, and their allies continued the use of propaganda in order to keep 
their populations motivated throughout the long struggle of the Cold War. In the 21Pst P 
                                                 
1 Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion, 7th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
SAGE, 2019), loc. 478 of 16608, Kindle. 
2 Jo Fox, Film Propaganda in Britain and Nazi Germany: World War II Cinema (Oxford: Berg, 2007), 
316. 
3 Adam Zamoyski, Phantom Terror: Political Paranoia and the Creation of the Modern State, 1789–
1848 (New York: Basic Books, 2015). 
4 Fox, Film Propaganda, 27. 
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century, the invention and widespread adoption of digital communication technologies on 
a staggering scale affords the capability to reach far greater numbers of individuals and 
with far greater ease than in the past. This provides new challenges and opportunities in 
efforts to influence and mobilize individuals and populations. Russia has been quick to 
seize upon this. 
Since, as Dr. Dimitar Bechev notes, Russia is not in a position to roll back NATO 
or the European Union (EU) solely by force of arms, the regime in Moscow turns to 
propaganda among other soft power tools to confront them. 4F5 The more or less bloodless 
2014 invasion of Crimea by Russian forces shocked NATO and since then, NATO has 
found itself the target of an increasing Russian strategic disinformation campaign. 5F6 Given 
Russia’s reliance on soft power and its increasing use of propaganda against NATO, it is 
vital to understand how NATO has countered Russian propaganda. In addition, it is critical 
to determine if NATO mass persuasion efforts have bolstered the alliance. NATO provides 
protection for 30 countries and hundreds of millions their citizens. Yet it exists because of 
the will and consent of the people it protects. Thus, the support of the populace is vital for 
its future existence. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Propaganda: Fata Morgana and Fact in the Grey Zone 
This literature review examines and seeks to define propaganda in modern warfare 
and geopolitics, with a nod to social media and the 21PstP century. Then it looks to ascertain 
the goals of Russian propaganda operations as well as the threat they pose to NATO allies. 
In brief, it discusses the tactics as well as some examples of Russian propaganda targeting 
NATO countries. In order to counter these operations, one must understand the continuity 
between Soviet and Russian propaganda from the early 20PthP century until the present, 
because this continuity is manifest. Lastly, the focus will turn to NATO, its efforts post-
                                                 
5 Dimitar Bechev, Rival Power: Russia’s Influence in Southeast Europe (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2017), loc. 4031 of 6864, Kindle. 
6 Foo Yun Chee, “NATO Says It Sees Sharp Rise in Russian Disinformation since Crimea,” Reuters, 
February 11, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-media-idUSKBN15Q0MG. 
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2014 to counter Russian propaganda, as well as what can be learned from NATO Cold War 
information efforts as these do or do not pertain to the present. 
In order to determine how NATO has countered Russian propaganda and bolstered 
the alliance it is first necessary to define propaganda as well as related terms. The thing we 
describe as propaganda has existed for thousands of years in various forms, yet 
democracies have often misunderstood this phenomenon and generally have viewed it in a 
negative context.6F7 As will be discussed, propaganda can be defined clearly, and certain key 
characteristics identified as well as requirements for success noted. Only by understanding 
what propaganda is and is not can one properly evaluate it and whether the 
countermeasures deployed against propaganda are proper and effective. 
Propaganda is an enduring phenomenon of organized violence and the political 
world in general; it can be traced back to the earliest records of civilization. 7F8 Yet, the actual 
origin of the word can be found in the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation,8F9 and 
over the following centuries its usage has developed into the context with which many 
individuals associate it today. As scholar David Welch notes, in the 16PthP century, the Roman 
Catholic Church found itself challenged by the rise of Protestantism. A commission of 
cardinals was created to spread the message and teachings of the Church to defeat heretics 
and reestablish the church in the lands where it had lost ground. In the early part of the 17 PthP 
century, Pope Gregory XV made this a permanent commission with the title Sacra 
Congregatio de Propaganda Fide. A few years later this became the College of Propaganda 
where new priests were trained before being dispatched on missions. 9F10 As Europe became 
a place of nation states, mass persuasion migrated from the first estate to the middle and 
                                                 
7 J. Michael Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media and Mass 
Persuasion, 1st Paperback ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 269–71. 
8 Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda, 3rd ed. (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2003), 24. 
9 Peter Guilday, “The Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide (1622–1922),” The Catholic 
Historical Review 6, no. 4 (January 1921): 478. 
10 Nicholas John Cull, David Holbrook Culbert, and David Welch, Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: 
A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003), XVI. 
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working classes. The advent of total war in the 20PthP century and the emergence of mass 
communication technologies caused the belligerents in World War One to adopt systemic 
propaganda strategies. As Taylor, Welch, and Miller discuss it was the false atrocity 
propaganda of World War One followed by the Nazi adoption in the 1920s and perversion 
of the British 1914–1918 propaganda model that gave propaganda the negative connotation 
that has existed since. 10F11 The use of propaganda in both world wars illustrated the power of 
propaganda to mobilize populations for total war and to help sustain the fight until 
unconditional victory. The lessons learned were applied by the Soviet Union, the United 
States, and NATO throughout the Cold War.11F12  
Propaganda is not easy to define. Its root lies in the Latin word propago meaning 
“to extend” or “to increase.”12F13 As a term of politics, society, and culture its first use, as 
noted, is associated with the Catholic Church’s attempt to defeat Protestantism and 
reestablish the unity of the Church. Yet, as Welch shows, the meaning of the word has 
changed over time and since the latter half of the 20PthP century has generally had a negative 
connotation of totalitarianism especially in democratic societies. 13F14 This meaning and the 
desire to avoid it is evidenced by the British World War Two propaganda agency being 
named the Ministry of Information or the U.S. propaganda arm during the Cold War being 
called the United States Information Agency. Welch defines propaganda as the “deliberate 
attempt to influence the opinions of an audience through the transmission of ideas and 
values for the specific purpose, consciously designed to serve the interests of the 
                                                 
11 Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, 3; Cull, Culbert, and Welch, Propaganda and Mass Persuasion, 
XVII; Edward L. Bernays, Propaganda (New York: H. Liveright, 1928), Reprinted with an introduction by 
Mark Crispin Miller, (Brooklyn, NY: Ig Publishing, 2005), 11–12, 14. 
12 Kenneth Alan Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and 
Abroad (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 32–33. 
13 Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion, loc. 431 of 16608, Kindle; Harpers’ Latin 
Dictionary: A New Latin Dictionary Founded on the Translation of Freund’s Latin-German Lexicon, s.v. 
“Propago,” https://www.latinitium.com/latin-dictionaries. 
14 Cull, Culbert, and Welch, Propaganda and Mass Persuasion, 317–23. 
 
 6 
propagandists and their political masters, either directly or indirectly.” 14F15 Earlier definitions 
use criteria such as whether the communication of the idea was successful or the sponsor 
hidden to determine whether something is propaganda. For example, Edward Bernays, who 
had an integral role at the U.S. Committee on Public Information in the pivotal period 
1917–1918, defined propaganda as “the conscious and intelligent manipulation of the 
masses” and to do so the sponsor was hidden while taking actions that generated news and 
thus influence. 15F16 Professors Jowett and O’Donnell provide a definition similar to Welch’s: 
“propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate 
cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the 
propagandist.” 16F17 This is the definition that will be used in this thesis. 
What is not propaganda is obvious in some ways and less so in others. Propaganda 
is not random or disorganized communication of ideas or values. Nor is it simply 
advertising for a commercial product, though advertising and propaganda share similarities 
in place, time, and personalities, i.e., modern propaganda is an offshoot of commercial 
society of the second industrial revolution as we know it, if not earlier. Two categories that 
are commonly confused with propaganda are: public information and mass persuasion. 
They are distinct and satisfy different purposes. As Jowett and O’Donnell argue, the 
purpose of information is to “promote mutual understanding” for both sender and receiver 
while persuasion seeks to “promote mutual fulfillment of needs” for both parties. This is 
in contrast to propaganda, that while combining elements of information and persuasion, 
seeks to benefit the sender and not necessarily the receiver. 17F18 
There are a number of key characteristics of propaganda that can be used to identify 
it. Knowledge and usage of these characteristics by the propagandist can increase the 
chances of success and conversely help the counterpropagandist in identifying and parrying 
the messaging. Visual propaganda (film, photographs, paintings, cartoons, etc.) can simply 
                                                 
15 Cull, Culbert, and Welch, 322. 
16 Osgood, Total Cold War, 20. 
17 Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion, loc. 576 of 16608, Kindle. 
18 Jowett and O’Donnell, loc. 1249 of 16608, Kindle. 
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convey multiple themes and messages via political and cultural symbols that can evoke an 
emotional and visceral response in an audience. Scholar Peter Paret recognizes the 
importance of visual art in conveying themes related to war and conflict. He writes: 
what art conveys best, and sometimes uniquely, has less to with the 
mechanics of war…than with the feelings about war of individuals and 
societies, with their attitudes toward the enemy and their own armed forces, 
and with the ways they connect war to other major elements in their lives—
economic activity, social and political authority, beliefs, personal 
relationships. 18F19 
Ellul argues that the propaganda must be systematically organized, continuous, and use all 
available means to convey it. 19F20 Ellul, Jowett, and O’Donnell note that including elements 
of the truth as well as targeting emotions of the intended recipient increases the chance of 
success. For Ellul, knowledge of the intended audience and thus tailoring the message is 
one of the most important aspects.20F21 
2. Implications for NATO Members and Partner States 
A review of the literature reveals that there is a consensus among the trinity of the 
people, the government, and the military that Russia is targeting the populations of NATO 
countries with propaganda in order to further its goals. Norwegian military officer and 
scholar Geir Hågen Karlsen writes that the long-term goal of Russian propaganda and 
influence operations directed at European countries is to “weaken NATO and the EU” 
while in the short-term seeking to undermine support for U.S. and EU sanctions against 
Russia following the 2014 Ukraine invasion. 21F22 Bechev takes a wider view writing that 
                                                 
19 Peter Paret, Imagined Battles: Reflections of War in European Art (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 1997), 7–10. 
20 Jacques Ellul, “The Characteristics of Propaganda,” in Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: 
New and Classic Essays, ed. Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications, 2006), 6, 11, 13. 
21 Ellul, 19–23. 
22 Geir Hågen Karlsen, “Divide and Rule: Ten Lessons about Russian Political Influence Activities in 




Russia seeks “to balance NATO militarily…and, to some extent, dilute EU 
enlargement.” 22F23 Bobo Lo, a scholar and former diplomat, writes that Russia has sought to 
counter the United States, undermine NATO, and drive a wedge between former Soviet 
states and the West.23F24 Scholars Martin Kragh and Sebastian Åsberg find that Russian 
propaganda contributes to its strategic goal “to minimize or remove NATO presence in the 
country’s ‘near abroad’.”24F25 There does appear to be debate regarding the seriousness of 
the threat to NATO posed by the Russian propaganda campaign, as a fraction of the public 
in such nations as Germany, Britain, and the U.S. deny that there is any undue Russian 
influence of any kind—indirect or direct—and, in fact, that Russia would be a superb ally 
as in the period 1941–1945. Bechev writes that while the threat is more serious to the Baltic 
states it is substantially less to states in Southeastern Europe.25F26 Karlsen is his study 
concludes that the threat posed by Russia propaganda is not serious, yet admits that a 
number of reports from Baltic countries assess the threat quite differently. 26F27 Kragh and 
Åsberg argue that it is not possible to determine the effectiveness and thus the threat of 
Russian propaganda. Yet, they write it is still critical to study and counter Russian 
propaganda. This is because the considerable effort Russia commits to these operations 
indicates the importance Russia places on its goals of undermining the West.27F28 
Russia uses multiple methods in its propaganda operations. In the literature, there 
is general consensus on how Russia broadly carries out its operations. Karlsen writes that 
Russia focuses on exploiting divisions at three levels: the European or NATO and EU level, 
                                                 
23 Bechev, Rival Power, loc. 3141 of 6864, Kindle. 
24 Bobo Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder (London: Chatham House, 2015), 210. 
25 Martin Kragh and Sebastian Åsberg, “Russia’s Strategy for Influence Through Public Diplomacy 
and Active Measures: The Swedish Case,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 6 (2017): 806, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1273830. 
26 Bechev, Rival Power, loc. 3297 of 6864, Kindle. 
27 Karlsen, “Divide and Rule,” 11. 
28 Kragh and Åsberg, “Russia’s Strategy for Influence,” 775.  
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interstate, and intrastate.28F29 This allows Russia to tailor the message that will be most 
receptive to a particular party.29F30 Research and Development (RAND) Corporation 
scientists Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews argue that Russian propaganda has the 
following qualities: “high-volume and multichannel; rapid, continuous, and repetitive; 
lacks commitment to objective reality; lacks commitment to consistency.”30F31 Similarly, the 
Atlantic Council Digital Forensic Lab describes Russian propaganda as utilizing the “4Ds” 
or distort, dismiss, dismay, and distract. 31F32 Analyst Monika Richter points out the Russian 
government’s promotion that objective, verifiable truth is impossible to obtain. 32F33 The 
constant messaging via multiple methods combined with disinformation seeks to cast doubt 
on the institutions, free press, and free elections of the West and thus divide and disrupt 
NATO. Russia attempts to reach target populations through the use of all manner of tools 
from traditional media to social media proxies to political parties. 33F34 Allen and Moore note 
the Russian usage of disinformation playing on emotions as well as historical 
animosities. 34F35 This is evidenced by two recent fake news events in Lithuania. In 2017, e-
mails were sent to the Lithuanian parliament and media outlets claiming German soldiers 
                                                 
29 Karlsen, “Divide and Rule,” 6. 
30 Christopher Paul et al., Lessons from Others for Future U.S. Army Operations in and Through the 
Information Environment, RR-1925/2-A (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2018), 171–72, 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1925z2.html.  
31 Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, The Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood’ Propaganda Model, 
PE-198-OSD (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2016), 2, https://doi.org/10.7249/PE198. 
32 Donara Barojan and Michael Sheldon, “#MinskMonitor: Disinformation Tactics Extend to Kerch,” 
@DFRLab, last modified January 7, 2019, https://medium.com/dfrlab/minskmonitor-disinformation-
tactics-extend-to-kerch-c32351c7c293. 
33 Monika L Richter, What We Know about RT (Russia Today), (Prague: European Values Think-
Tank, October 9, 2017), 10, https://www.europeanvalues.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/What-We-
Know-about-RT-Russia-Today-1.pdf. 
34 Karlsen, “Divide and Rule,” 6, 9; Todd C. Helmus et al., Russian Social Media Influence: 
Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe, RR-2237-OSD (Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation, 2018), 1–2, https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2237. 
35 T. S. Allen and A. J. Moore, “Victory Without Casualties: Russia’s Information Operations,” 
Parameters 48, no. 1 (Spring 2018): 65–66. 
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in support of a NATO mission had raped an underage Lithuanian girl. 35F36 In 2018, a website 
mimicking Lithuania’s top news site spread the fake story that a U.S. Army vehicle on a 
NATO exercise had run over and killed a boy on a bicycle. 36F37  
Though the means of execution in the 21PstP century have changed, there is continuity 
with the Soviet active measures of the classical past from 1918 until the 1980s. The links 
between today’s propaganda operations and those of the past are noted in the literature 
though there is some disagreement over how similar they are. Steve Abrams writes that 
Russian propaganda operations today are a continuation of policy that dates back to Soviet 
times if not to those phases when Russian policy and power reached deeply into Western 
Europe, especially in the epoch 1815–1852, when Russia was a central part of the Holy 
Alliance. He argues that “Russia has simply recycled and updated these age-old subversion 
techniques.”37F38 Researcher Lesley Kucharski notes that Russia is using the Soviet practice 
of an “institutionalized system for coordinating and implementing…overt and covert, non-
military and military information operations.” 38F39 However, Kucharski writes that 
postmodern forms of communication via the digital juggernaut as well as the increased 
influence of non-governmental organizations have led to modifications of the Soviet active 
measures strategy. 39F40 Allen and Moore note the similarity in the goal of Soviet and Russia 
                                                 
36 “NATO: Russia Targeted German Army with Fake News Campaign,” Deutsche Welle, February 
16, 2017, https://www.dw.com/en/nato-russia-targeted-german-army-with-fake-news-campaign/a-
37591978. 
37Andrius Sytas, “Lithuania Sees Fake News Attempt to Discredit NATO Exercises,” Reuters, June 
13, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-russia-idUSKBN1J92FC. 
38 Steve Abrams, “Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin’s Russia,” Connections: The 
Quarterly Journal 15, no. 1 (2016): 18, http://dx.doi.org/10.11610/Connections.15.1.01. 
39 Lesley Kucharski, Russian Multi-Domain Strategy Against NATO: Information Confrontation and 
U.S. Forward-Deployed Nuclear Weapons in Europe, (Livermore, CA: The Center for Global Security 
Research, 2018), 7, 
https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/4Feb_IPb_against_NATO_nuclear_posture.pdf.  
40 Kucharski, 2–3. 
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propaganda operations: “divide the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
alliance.”40F41 
Though literature exists on NATO public information and mass persuasion efforts 
since 2014 there is scant evaluation of its effectiveness. 41F42 Most of the literature tends to 
either complement NATO’s efforts and recommend additional steps be taken or simply 
provides advice on what NATO and EU countries should do to combat Russian 
propaganda. Public diplomacy scholar Barbora Maronkova argues that NATO and its 
partners are pursuing the right course of action. They need only to continue showcasing 
“Western values, institutions, and beliefs” as the “best options for prosperity and peace.”42F43 
Researcher Eric Adamson writes that NATO has made progress in countering Russian 
disinformation, but “efforts remain fragmented and often underfunded.”43F44 Scholars, 
Corneliu Bjola and James Pamment argue that NATO’s response should be “a strategy of 
digital containment based on the tenets of supporting media literacy and source criticism, 
encouraging institutional resilience, and promoting a clear and coherent strategic 
narrative.”44F45 Professor Andrew Wolff argues that NATO has a public perception problem 
                                                 
41 Allen and Moore, “Victory Without Casualties,” 61. 
42 Barbora Maronkova, “From Crawling to Walking: Progress in Evaluating the Effectiveness of 
Public Diplomacy: Lessons Learned from NATO,” CPD Perspectives (Los Angeles: University of Southern 
California, February 2018), 6–8, 20, 
https://www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/From%20Crawling%20to%20Wal
king_Maronkova.pdf. 
43 Barbora Maronkova, “Countering Russian Propaganda: NATO’s Role,” The Fletcher Forum of 
World Affairs, March 12, 2017, http://www.fletcherforum.org/home/2017/3/12/countering-russian-
propaganda-natos-role. 
44 Eric Adamson, “Defending the Information Space: Russian Disinformation and Western 
Responses,” European Student Think Tank (blog), April 4, 2019, 
http://www.esthinktank.com/2019/04/04/defending-the-information-space-russian-disinformation-and-
western-responses/. 
45 Corneliu Bjola and James Pamment, “Digital Containment: Revisiting Containment Strategy in the 
Digital Age,” Global Affairs 2, no. 2 (2016): 131, https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2016.1182244. 
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and “should consider adopting a long-term branding strategy.” 45F46 In 2014, in some ways 
answering these critiques, NATO established in Riga the NATO Strategic 
Communications Center of Excellence. 46F47 This is a key organization for NATO in 
combating Russian influence. It contributes to NATO public affairs as well as public 
diplomacy efforts. In 2017, NATO launched its first alliance-wide branding campaign in 
10 years. The campaign, #WeAreNATO, seeks to build solidarity within NATO and to 
increase global understanding of what NATO does. It is a multimedia campaign that 
includes short videos showcasing individual NATO soldiers, sailors, marines, and 
airmen. 47F48 NATO also has an operation that publicly refutes disinformation about the 
Alliance. 48F49 
An examination of NATO actions as well as those of national governments to 
counter Soviet propaganda during the Cold War can well perhaps provide lessons for today. 
A number of scholars advocate using the Cold War era strategies and tactics including the 
Active Measures Working Group as templates for today.49F50 Author Seth Jones argues that 
it is time “to resurrect a modified version of its Cold War playbook and develop an 
                                                 
46 Andrew T. Wolff, “Crafting a NATO Brand: Bolstering Internal Support for the Alliance through 
Image Management,” Contemporary Security Policy 35, no. 1 (2014): 73, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.885708. 
47 “About Us,” NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2019, 
https://www.stratcomcoe.org/about-us. 
48 Hassan Butt, “NATO Launches Branded Communications Campaign #WeAreNato,” Communicate, 
June 12, 2017, http://www.communicatemagazine.com/news/2017/nato-launches-branded-
communications-campaign-wearenato/; “#WEARENATO,” NATO, accessed May 13, 2019, 
https://www.nato.int/wearenato/. 
49 “NATO–Russia Relations: The Facts,” NATO, August 9, 2019, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_111767.htm. 
50 Nate Low, “Cold War Lessons for Countering Covert Action,” New Perspectives in Foreign Policy, 
no. 16 (Fall 2018): 29–33; John Fund, “Combating Russian Disinformation: Use Reagan’s Techniques,” 




information campaign that can compete with Moscow.” 50F51 Dr. Osgood offers insight into 
the extent of early Cold War propaganda efforts of the U.S. government to mobilize the 
U.S. population for the long struggle and to win the hearts and minds of the populations of 
neutrals and allies. 51F52 Professor Linda Risso’s book provides a useful history of the NATO 
Information Service (NATIS) from its founding until the end of the Cold War. The book 
not only illuminates NATIS campaigns, but also the difficulties of mounting alliance-wide 
information operations and then measuring their impacts. Though new means of 
communications exist the challenges of coordinating across 30 countries and reaching 
target audiences are much the same. 52F53 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis investigates the hypothesis that Russia’s anti-NATO propaganda 
activities are a continuation of the Soviet Union’s mass persuasion efforts. Confirming 
such a linkage could illuminate the way to counter Russian propaganda, which exploits 
ethnic and political divisions in Europe and portrays NATO as an aggressor. In brief, Soviet 
(and later Russian) propaganda was offensive and focused on attacking the U.S. and 
NATO. Since the propaganda threat was faced by NATO during the Cold War, the lessons 
drawn from this time can help evaluate today’s response or surely enable those on the front 
lines of great power conflict better to understand the essence and character of this so-called 
grey zone conflict which is often treated in an analytically sloppy manner. 
In addition, this thesis investigates the hypothesis that since 2014 NATO public 
diplomacy and mass persuasion efforts have countered Russian propaganda and bolstered 
the alliance. NATO is not only responding to the spurious claims in Russian propaganda, 
but the themes and symbols present in NATO messaging embody the values of the 
                                                 
51 Seth G. Jones, “Going on the Offensive: A U.S. Strategy to Combat Russian Information Warfare,” 
CSIS Briefs (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2018), 10, 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/going-offensive-us-strategy-combat-russian-information-warfare. 
52 Osgood, Total Cold War. 
53 Linda Risso, Propaganda and Intelligence in the Cold War: The NATO Information Service (New 
York: Routledge, 2014), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315871158. 
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Alliance. Thus, NATO mass persuasion promotes NATO and the western, liberal ideals 
that it is founded on. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research will have two main components: a comparative analysis of Russian 
and NATO propaganda and case studies examining military exercises. The first component 
will take a theoretical approach to analyze the function, meaning, and interplay of 
propaganda produced by both sides since 2014 along with the historical roots of the 
propaganda in the Cold War. It will also examine historical themes conveyed within the 
propaganda. Lastly, it will seek to glean what this propaganda tells one about the society 
that created it. The primary mediums examined will be images, photographs, and 
film/video. The two case studies will be divided between a recent Russian military exercise 
and a NATO one. Through the comparative analysis of propaganda and review of case 
studies I intend to discover the answer to my questions. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
In order to address these important and challenging questions the structure and use 
of a standard format will be critical. This is important to facilitate a sound analysis of the 
research, but it will also make it easier on the reader to progress through the thesis. Chapters 
II and III will provide a brief overview of the particular side’s efforts since 2014 and how 
this compares to their Cold War propaganda efforts. Then selected film/video and 
photographic propaganda pieces from the Cold War period and since 2014 will be analyzed 
by examining their function, meaning, and historical themes. The case studies will also 
follow a standard format and examine a major military exercise conducted by Russia and 
one by NATO. Special focus in these case studies will be on propaganda efforts by Russia 
and NATO for and against each topic. Such an outline will best enable the quest to answer 
the questions posed by this thesis. 
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II. RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA SUCCESSOR TO A SOVIET PAST 
This study makes the argument that Russian propaganda aimed at NATO, what 
some are calling hybrid warfare, is neither an altogether new nor especially startling 
phenomenon if one analyzes this process with some greater reference to European history 
and the record of the age of total war in the 20PthP century. Putin’s Russia is the heir of the 
USSR and, in a way, of Tsarist Russia with its ideas, strategies, and tactics which left a 
deep imprint on the politics of Europe and beyond. That is, the indirect and direct impact 
of Russia especially on its western neighbors is not a new form of aggression, but a 
continuation of a long-term one in which Russian/Soviet ambitions were projected 
westward as part of statecraft and the subversive statecraft that was at the core of the Soviet 
state. The Russia of today draws from this Soviet past and though the ideologies of Russia 
and the Soviet Union are different relative to the supposed universal appeal of Marxism–
Leninism in its Soviet form, there are many similarities to the goals, themes, methods, and 
means of Soviet propaganda as an expression of Russian statecraft. Thus, to comprehend 
and combat the Russian propaganda of today one must understand the Soviet propaganda 
of the past—a difficult task because of the generalized amnesia that has befallen the year 
2020. 
The first section of this chapter briefly examines the Soviet stance towards NATO 
after 1949 and the goals that the Soviets sought to support or even achieve through the use 
of anti-Western propaganda. Following this issue, the themes, methods, and means of 
Soviet propaganda targeting NATO are discussed. Lastly, eight pieces of visual 
propaganda are analyzed to provide a deeper understanding of the symbols and associated 
themes that the propagandists sought to amplify (or introduce) in the mind of the viewer.  
In the second section of this chapter the focus shifts to Russian propaganda since 
2014. It uses the same framework as the Soviet section in order to make it easy for the 
reader to note the similarities as well as the differences between Soviet and Russian 
propaganda. The section closes with an analysis of seven visual propaganda pieces that 
assist in clearly highlighting Russian propagandists’ reuse of Soviet anti-NATO themes. 
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Finally, the chapter ends with a brief section providing insights and observations 
on Soviet and Russian propaganda with a particular emphasis on the latter. An examination 
of Russian propaganda regarding NATO and its Soviet antecedents serves as a predicate to 
answering the questions posed at the outset of this thesis, for by understanding the origins, 
goals, and techniques of Russian propaganda, the reader may derive lessons for NATO that 
are useful in the making of strategy. 
A. THE SOVIET ROOTS OF RUSSIA’S PROPAGANDA AGAINST NATO 
1. Soviet Views on Propaganda 
Throughout the existence of the Soviet Union from the years after 1918 until 1991, 
the Soviet leadership placed great emphasis on propaganda as central to the regime at home 
and abroad and also the fate of its allies. The Soviet leadership saw it as a critical tool of 
both domestic and foreign policy. Propaganda could help to enhance the stature and 
policies of the Soviet state and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 
demonize and divide a decadent West, and obscure the weakness of the USSR which was 
always a feature of the making of policy. Lenin recognized the importance of propaganda 
to the Bolshevik cause and using various means to spread it in the epoch prior to the 
revolution itself. In 1911 he wrote: “The art of any propagandist and agitator consists in 
his ability to find the best means of influencing any given audience, by presenting a definite 
truth, in such a way as to make it most convincing, most easy to digest, most graphic, and 
most strongly impressive.” 53F54 Professor Emeritus Peter Kenez argues that during the 
Russian Revolution in 1917–1919, Lenin and his fellow revolutionaries grasped the 
propaganda value of the new medium of film better than anyone else.54F55 Scholars Garth 
Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell write that Lenin and other leaders of the Bolshevik 
                                                 
54 V.I. Lenin, “The Slogans and Organisation of Social-Democratic Work Inside and Outside the 
Duma,” in Sotsial-Demokrat, No. 25, December 8 (21), 1911, ed. George Hanna, trans. Dora Cox, Fourth 
Edition, vol. 17 December 1910-April 1912, Lenin Collected Works (Moscow, USSR: Progress Publishers, 
1977), 341, https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/cw/pdf/lenin-cw-vol-17.pdf. 
55 Peter Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917–1929 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 106. 
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revolution embraced propaganda as a means to further the 1917 revolution and manipulate 
the thinking of a 170 million Russians, many of whom were illiterate. In this effort the 
Soviet leaders utilized all forms of communication: print, radio, art, photography and film, 
the latter being especially important given the illiteracy rates. They controlled it via a 
centralized, top-down bureaucracy.55F56 Professor Emeritus Victoria Bonnell writes that the 
Bolshevik seizure of control over all forms of communication was necessary for them to 
generate consensus on “many fundamental issues of interpretation…by introducing new 
symbols, rituals, and visual imagery.” 56F57 The immense system of influence and 
manipulation lasted until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. A historical 
encyclopedia on propaganda charts the major shifts in the Soviet propaganda system during 
this time. Importantly, the encyclopedia notes the increasingly prevalent use of the myth 
of the Great Patriotic War throughout the Brezhnev period as the Soviet leadership sought 
to distract from the stagnation of the USSR. 57 F58 Soviet propaganda was not limited to the 
domestic front. In the 1930s, the Soviet desire to foment communist revolution worldwide 
as well as hype the workers’ paradise of the Soviet Union necessitated the use of significant 
propaganda campaigns. 58F59 Intelligence analyst Kevin McCauley argues that the Soviets 
recognized the power of propaganda in having a “cumulative long-term effect to mobilize 
and strengthen existing opinion, define the terms of the debate, and…support 
other…campaigns.” 59F60 The emergence of the Cold War and the founding of NATO in 1949 
provided a new opportunity for the USSR to utilize its massive propaganda infrastructure 
and an opponent to direct it against as more or less a continuation of the effort that came 
to a peak in the recent war.  
                                                 
56 Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion, loc. 6376–6393 of 16608, Kindle. 
57 Victoria E. Bonnell, Iconography of Power: Soviet Political Posters under Lenin and Stalin, 1st ed. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 1. 
58 Cull, Culbert, and Welch, Propaganda and Mass Persuasion, 361–63. 
59 Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion, loc. 6446 of 16608, Kindle. 
60 Kevin McCauley, Russian Influence Campaigns against the West: From the Cold War to Putin, 
Kindle ed. (North Charleston, SC: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016), loc. 75 of 9797, 
Kindle. 
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The leadership of the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War highly valued and 
controlled propaganda campaigns at the highest levels of government. They also devoted 
significant resources to these operations. 
The apparatus of the party state developed and utilized by the Soviets to develop, 
approve, and disseminate propaganda as well as the resources spent were significant. The 
U.S. Department of State, along with scholars including Richard Shultz, Roy Godson, 
Richard Staar, Clews, and Frederick Barghoorn, conclude that policies, themes, and the 
evaluation of the propaganda and active measure campaigns were decided by the 
Politburo. 60F61 The structure of the propaganda bureaucracy varied over the course of the 
Soviet Union. According to Shultz, Godson, and Barghoorn, throughout the early Cold 
War period and lasting until 1978 the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the 
CPSU Central Committee oversaw both domestic and foreign propaganda. 61F62 The 
International Department’s (ID) role was to coordinate the activities of foreign communist 
parties not in power as well as front groups. 62F63 After 1978, the Department of Agitation and 
Propaganda was replaced with the International Information Department (IID) and there is 
debate, as Shultz and Godson note, as to whether the IID really inherited the full roles and 
responsibilities of its predecessor or whether many of these went to the ID.63F64 To support 
these vast propaganda and active measure operations the Soviets spent billions. According 
to Staar, the Central Intelligence Agency estimated that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
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as conflict with NATO resumed in connection with the Afghan invasion, the Polish crisis, 
and the INF episode, the Soviet Union was spending up to $4 billion annually on foreign 
propaganda and active measure operations. 64F65 
2. How the Soviets Used Propaganda Against NATO 
Soviet propaganda against NATO can be divided into white, grey, and black 
propaganda. These anti-NATO propaganda campaigns formed a subset of the larger 
propaganda apparatus that was used in conjunction with aktivnyye meropriyatiya or “active 
measures” to influence foreign nations and populations in order to further Soviet policy 
and objectives. 
The categorization of propaganda into white, gray, and black is based upon the 
transparency of the source of the information as well as the degree of truth conveyed. Staar 
focuses more on the source of the Soviet propaganda in characterizing it. He writes that 
Soviet white propaganda originated from such official sources as Radio Moscow or the 
Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) though it was coordinated and directed by 
the Soviet propaganda bureaucracy. Grey propaganda emanated from groups that had an 
appearance of independence as Soviet friendship societies or the World Peace Council and 
thus the Soviet direction and control of the messaging was obscured. Lastly, black 
propaganda supposedly originated in the targeted countries, but was really orchestrated by 
the KGB or other clandestine units. 65F66 Jowett and O’Donnell, generally discussing the 
characterization of propaganda, equally focus on the degree of truth in the message as well 
as how transparent to the recipient the source origin is. 66F67 Clews, writing decades before 
Jowett and O’Donnell, provides a shorter but similar evaluation of propaganda 
categories. 67F68   
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The phrase aktivnyye meropriyatiya or active measures covers a number of covert 
practices used by the Soviets to influence foreign governments and populations. Many of 
these operations supported or were supported by propaganda to benefit the Soviet Union. 
The U.S. Department of State defines Soviet active measures as “covert or deceptive 
operations conducted in support of Soviet foreign policy.” 68F69 The techniques included 
forgeries, political influence operations, and media manipulation. Starr agrees with this 
definition but includes assassinations as an additional form of active measures.69F70 
Propaganda worked in conjunction with active measures for example by promulgating 
through radio and print media fake or misleading information found in forgeries developed 
and planted by Soviet clandestine units. 
3. The Tools Used by the USSR to Disseminate Anti-NATO Propaganda 
The Soviet propaganda apparatus used multiple forms of communication to 
disseminate anti-NATO propaganda. These forms included broadcasts (radio and 
television), print publications especially copy provided by print agencies, interviews and 
speeches by Soviet officials, efforts of cultural and friendship organizations, posters, film, 
and military parades. This was done to both expose the greatest possible number of 
individuals of the targeted populace to the propaganda and to increase through repetition 
the likelihood of the propaganda’s influence. It is worth describing a few of these means 
to give the reader a sense of the Soviet Union’s efforts and the resources devoted to 
propaganda. 
Radio broadcasts and to a lesser extent television broadcasts were a primary means 
of disseminating propaganda to the world. According to Staar, in 1989, Radio Moscow 
spent 2,179 hours a week on foreign broadcasts. This is total is based on broadcasts in 84 
languages to over 100 countries. Other communist states in East and Central Europe 
contributed another 2,270 hours of foreign radio broadcasts. To give perspective, the hours 
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broadcast per week in 1950 by the USSR and East–Central European communist countries 
was 533 and 412, respectively. 70F71 Similar to the Soviet approach to the press wire services, 
the Soviets supported a nominally independent radio network, Radio Peace and Progress 
(RPP) that began broadcasting in 1964. As Staar writes, the RPP allowed the Soviets to 
broadcast more inflammatory or harsh messages while denying responsibility and pointing 
to the RPP’s independence. The RPP devoted 158 hours per week to programming in 15 
foreign languages. 71F72 
Print publications including newspapers, journals, magazines, and pamphlets all 
were used to further Soviet propaganda messaging. The press agencies of the USSR were 
especially important as they had a large staff and were located worldwide. This allowed 
the Soviets to build connections with local newspapers and find more vehicles for Soviet 
propaganda. The TASS and the Agentstvo Pechati Novosti (APN) were, according to a 
couple of sources, the most important. 72F73 TASS, founded in 1904, was one of the oldest 
news agencies in the Soviet Union. According to the 1986 Soviet Active Measures report, 
TASS had a staff of 400 spread globally with accredited correspondents in 126 nations. 
From the 1960s to the 1980s, the number of countries with access to the TASS service 
doubled to 115 with TASS providing copy to over 600 newspapers, networks, and other 
agencies. 73F74 The work of TASS, as the official news service of the USSR, was 
supplemented by the unofficial APN, founded in 1961. APN, like many other aspects of 
life in the USSR, was controlled by the CPSU. Staar writes that one of the heads of the 
APN was a KGB officer who assisted in planning the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
In addition, he notes that an entire section of APN was staffed by KGB officers. 74F75 Of note, 
TASS and APN news articles lacked, in many cases, author bylines. 75F76 
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The Soviets used talented artists to illustrate graphics and cartoons that could 
quickly convey propaganda themes with few words. Not only could these images be easily 
disseminated via print pamphlets, but they could also be enlarged and used as posters in 
demonstrations. For example, McCauley writes of a poster and leaflet published in October 
1979 by the World Peace Council, an organization covertly supported by the Soviets, that 
were used to rally support and spark protests against NATO approving deployment of 
Pershing II Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) and additional nuclear armed 
cruise missiles in Europe. 76F77 
Film also played an important propaganda role in visually conveying the might of 
communism and the USSR while attacking NATO. In the wake of the 1961 construction 
of the Berlin Wall, the offensive screed against NATO went into overdrive, and one 
example of this process was the 1963 film Streng Geheim or For Your Eyes Only. Produced 
in East Germany, the film depicted the East German security services (Stasi) uncovering 
and foiling a plot by the Western allies to invade the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR).77F78 Of note, according to scholar Marcus M. Payk, the film made documentary 
claims and stated that the film was based on real-life events. 78F79 In this vein, NATO was just 
a continuation of Hitler’s Germany by other means, and the Wall and the regime in the 
GDR were a bulwark against NATO aggression to overturn the Yalta order of the 
international system.  
4. The Soviet View on NATO 
Throughout the Cold War, the leadership of the Soviet Union viewed NATO as a 
military and political threat, though the severity of the threat shifted throughout this period 
as the Cold War went from episodes of armed confrontation to a reduction of tensions and 
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back to armed confrontation. NATO was perceived as a military threat initially due to its 
support for the rearmament of West Germany and its integration into NATO in the period 
1949–1955, later when the U.S. made it clear that its nuclear umbrella extended to NATO 
in the middle and late 1950s, and ultimately as NATO obtained nuclear weapons based in 
Europe in this period as well. NATO was a political threat as it helped to unify the Western 
European democracies against Communism where, in the late 1940s, local Stalinist parties 
in especially Italy and France were on the march. Author Geoffrey Roberts argues that, 
among other reasons, Stalin and his successors strenuously objected to a rearmed West 
Germany because of the formative experiences of contending with a militarized and 
powerful Nazi Germany. 79F80 The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) as an extension of 
the Third Reich and the U.S. as the heir to the ideas of the Third Reich stood uppermost in 
this cosmos of Soviet propaganda canards which also found willing adherents in the publics 
of NATO allies themselves as well as in the non-aligned nations. Further support for the 
view that the Soviets believed NATO to be a threat comes from scholar Erik P. Hoffmann, 
who writes that Stalin perceived the socialist countries of Eastern Europe that had earlier 
been in the German orbit of Axis Europe as crucial for the defense of the Soviet Union as 
they provided a buffer from the military and ideological threat posed by the Western 
democracies. Stalin sought to stop NATO’s creation and when that failed, he moved to 
divide and weaken it through an unrelenting effort of psychological aggression that, for 
instance, argued that the FRG was illegitimate. 80F81 Stalin pursued this policy against NATO 
because the creation of NATO was seen as a threat to this buffer zone and the Soviets’ 
ability to influence and control weaker countries in Western Europe. Scholar R. Craig 
Nation points out that the creation of the Warsaw Pact was directly linked to the 
rearmament and integration of the FRG into NATO in 1949–1955. 81F82 From the late 1950s 
and into the 1980s NATO’s military threat to Russia was particularly embodied in NATO’s 
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fielding of tactical and theater-level nuclear weapons in response to which anti-nuclear 
movements evolved, for example, in the United Kingdom (UK) and the FRG. Nation writes 
of the Soviet angst at failing to prevent this deployment in the late 1950s and later, in the 
1977–1987 INF epoch, in bitterly objecting to NATO’s approval of the Pershing II IRBM’s 
and cruise missiles to Europe. Nation argues that the introduction of these theater nuclear 
weapons and other advanced technologies eliminated the safety provided by the Soviet’s 
Eastern Europe buffer.82F83 Throughout the Cold War period the Soviets relied on 
propaganda, among other tools, to minimize the threat posed by NATO to the USSR’s 
security and to its foreign policy goals. 
5. Goals of Soviet Anti-NATO Propaganda 
Given the perceived threat posed by NATO to the Soviet Union in the epoch 1949–
1989, the Soviets set their propaganda apparatus to the goal of destabilizing and thus 
weakening the cohesiveness of the NATO allies. Divisions about policy and strategy within 
NATO would in turn allow the USSR greater influence in Europe and also reduce the 
effectiveness of Western European states if a general conflict ensued. Soviet propaganda 
against NATO sought to bolster the image that the Soviet Union only wanted peace and 
that the West was the aggressor as in the traditional view of western Europe in the Russian 
view of its own special place in the system of states and the perpetual struggle between 
culture and civilization as adapted to the policy of the USSR in the 1950s onward.  
Author John C. Clews argues that Soviet communists saw it as critical that any 
opposition or potential opposition in Central Europe be prevented from uniting especially 
in an alliance such as NATO. 83F84 Propaganda could help realize this goal in a manner short 
of conventional or nuclear warfare. McCauley writes that the Soviets sought to shift the 
balance of alliances in the USSR’s favor and that of the Warsaw Pact by sowing discord 
and exploiting differences between the NATO allies. The propaganda campaign against 
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NATO also sought to foster a favorable environment for Kremlin policies while hiding the 
true objectives of the Soviets. 84F85 Traditional leftist propaganda messaging focused on peace 
and reduction of tension could lull populations into mistaking or misreading Soviet 
intentions and foreign policy objectives. In 1983 at the time of the INF crisis in Western 
Europe, U.S. analyst Charles Sorrels reported that the Soviet priority goals were to 
“weaken the defensive ties…to establish Soviet predominance over Western Europe.”85F86 
Propaganda could help by undermining support for a major U.S. armed forces presence on 
the Continent, deployment of new nuclear weapons, and aggressive stances toward the 
USSR. Starr wrote that the objective of external Soviet propaganda was to portray the 
foreign policy of the USSR as seeking only peace. In addition, such propaganda portrayed 
the Soviet Union as the only just and fair nation on the planet.86F87 Propaganda could portray 
the Soviets as the peaceful party and NATO as the aggressor. In pursuit of these goals the 
Soviets focused on a number of major themes that appeared throughout all forms of their 
anti-NATO propaganda. 
6. The Common Themes Illustrated by Soviet Anti-NATO Propaganda 
Soviet themes found in anti-NATO propaganda tend to focus on three facets: 
NATO as a militaristic and revanchist alliance; NATO as a puppet of the war mongering 
and monied interests in an imperialistic U.S.; and the USSR as the peaceful and aggrieved 
party. These themes appeared consistently in order to reinforce the Soviet messaging and 
to support the aforementioned goals. Clews writes that the communists had long argued 
that it was capitalism that manifested aggression, imperialism, and warmongering. Thus, 
since communists were not capitalists, they were incapable of harboring these traits and 
instead pursued more peaceful endeavors.87F88 Roberts supports this in writing that the 
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propaganda theme prevalent in the late 1940s and early 1950s of the USSR having a peace-
loving policy had its roots in the 1920s and originated in the view that the economic 
inequalities and the competition viewed as inherent of capitalism consistently led to war. 88F89 
Clews points out that the Soviets used propaganda to encourage complacency among its 
international adversaries, “to encourage rivalries between others on the ‘divide and rule’ 
principle,” to shield the USSR from critical attention, and to encourage the belief that world 
communism is inevitable. 89F90 
7. Soviet Visual Propaganda Analysis 
The following pieces of media: a photograph, a film, a cartoon, and a number of 
posters were selected, and an analysis performed on each in order to provide a sampling of 
the propaganda the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact directed against NATO. Photographs, 
cartoons, posters, and film were an integral element in disseminating Soviet messages to 
an internal and external audience and were distributed through various means discussed in 
the previous section.  
These propaganda posters and cartoons come from a rich tradition of 
Bolshevik/Soviet propaganda art that sought to influence widely and utilized imagery to 
do so, since much of the Russian population at the time of the revolution was illiterate. As 
Professor Emeritus Tom Gleason notes, some of the earliest propaganda posters were those 
produced by the ROSTA (Russian Telegraph Agency) of the early 1920s. They were made 
for display in windows and other locations to motivate the Russian population to achieve 
goals established by the state.90F91 Even in these early days, the artists were highly skilled 
and organized into committees and unions. Later, after Nazi Germany’s invasion of the 
Soviet Union, the Union of Soviet Artists formed a studio within TASS, modelled on the 
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ROSTA studio, to create propaganda posters to support military defense. 91F92 Though 
primarily aimed at a domestic audience, these TASS studio posters found wide distribution 
amongst the Allied Powers, especially in the U.S. and UK. 92F93 Two other important 
generators of propaganda art were Krokodil (The Crocodile) and the Boevoi Karandash 
(Militant or War Pencil). The Krokodil was a satirical publication produced in the USSR 
from 1922 until 2008. It lampooned topics, including Western governments and policies, 
that the CPSU sought to attack.93F94 Boevoi Karandash was an artists’ collective formed in 
Leningrad in 1939 that produced posters until 1945 and then resumed creation of satirical 
posters from 1956 until 1970.94F95 
The postcard, Figure 1, was produced in 1958 by Kukryniksy, an artist collective. 
This collective was formed in 1924 by three artists: Porfirii Krylov (1902–1990), Mikhail 
Kupriianov (1903–1991), and Nikolai Sokolov (1903–2000). Throughout its existence, the 
collective was prolific and created illustrations for Soviet newspapers such as Pravda and 
magazines including Krokodil. During the Second World War, Kukryniksy worked at the 
TASS studio noted earlier. Kukryniksy won numerous awards (five Stalin Prizes, one 
Lenin Prize, and one State Prize of the USSR) for their illustrations and paintings from the 
1940s into the 1970s. 95F96 
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Figure 1. Soviet Anti-NATO Propaganda Postcard against General Speidel 
of the Bundeswehr in His NATO CINCCENT Role.96F97 
This illustration attacks West German membership in NATO as the legacy of a 
revival of the Wehrmacht. It features General Hans Speidel, a Wehrmacht general during 
the Second World War who later served in the West German Army. Once the new 
Bundeswehr came into existence despite an intense USSR and GDR propaganda campaign 
to delegitimize the armament of the Bonn state in NATO, General Speidel was appointed 
Supreme Commander of the NATO ground forces in Europe. He held the post from 1957 
to 1963. He played an important role in the rearmament of West Germany and its 
integration into NATO.97F98 
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General Speidel is depicted as a Nazi soldier and the intent is clearly to link in the 
propaganda recipient’s mind NATO with three themes: Nazi Germany, warmongering, and 
as a vassal of the U.S. The first goal manifested the Soviet tactic of connecting NATO with 
the barbaric behavior of the Nazi regime and thus making NATO a criminal organization. 
The second theme bolstered Soviet claims that the NATO Alliance was aggressive and 
offensive in contrast to a peaceful USSR and Warsaw Pact. The third sought to sow discord 
between the U.S. and the European NATO members for those in NATO who had 
previously been a victim of the Wehrmacht, as in the case of France. 
In order to generate the linkages to the three themes numerous symbols quite 
familiar to viewers of this period appear. Speidel is decorated with two Iron Cross medals 
with the ribbons stating, “War Against France” and “War Against England.” On his head 
he wears the Stahlhelm, the style of helmet made iconic by its usage by German forces 
during the First and Second World War, emblazoned with the Nazi swastika. It has what 
appears to be a horn like on a contact mine or as if Speidel has physical horns like a devil. 
On one side a dripping blood stain appears in the outline of part of the European continent. 
To accentuate the idea that Speidel, representing a rearmed West Germany, and by 
extension NATO are harbingers of death and destruction a skull appears on each of his 
epaulettes as in fact was worn by certain officers of the German military. The officer’s 
cover with the wording “NATO” and “European Army” indicates Speidel’s role as 
Supreme Commander of the NATO ground forces in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
Placing it on top of the Stahlhelm indicates that NATO is built on the foundation of Nazism. 
The cover is adorned with a skull resting on what appears to be a mushroom cloud of an 
atomic bomb explosion rising from the visor. This skull on the officer’s cap would also 
elicit in the mind of the viewer of this period the Totenkopf or death’s head widely 
associated with Schutzstaffel (SS) units. The swastika pupils, glasses, beak-like nose, and 
frown all serve to convey a feeling of a cold and calculating individual. Lastly, a large hand 
reaches out to tap Speidel in a paternalistic gesture. The items adorning the arm: the suit, 
watch, and dollar sign cufflink all signal that the imperialist, capitalist U.S. is in control.  
The only vibrant colors, yellow and red, serve two distinct purposes as they stand 
in stark contrast to the grayscale of the rest of the illustration. The yellow background 
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forces the figure of Speidel out into the viewers’ space. The red color of the fresh blood 
reminds the viewer of the stakes, the human lives that NATO will destroy. 
B. Semenov’s poster, Figure 2, produced in 1961 is a dramatic depiction replete 
with symbols connecting NATO to themes of warmongering, Nazi Germany, and 
subordination to the U.S. The Federal German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer rides in a huge 
thurible or censer, usually a vessel used to dispense incense during religious ceremonies—
a play on Adenauer’s Catholic roots and the Rhenish capital of Bonn in West Germany. 
Here the censer brings war. The vessel is filled with huge bombs, likely atomic, painted 
with letters that spell out “NATO.” Adenauer carries a flaming torch symbolizing war 
while also calling to mind the torches carried by Nazis during party rallies. This connection 
to Nazism is reinforced by the Iron Cross medal hanging from his neck.  
The direction of motion of the censer is towards the Brandenburg Gate in the 
bottom right of the illustration as an indication of West German revanchism which was a 
standard article of Soviet propaganda especially at the time of the Berlin Wall and the 
Berlin crisis which had revived in 1958. At this time, the Brandenburg Gate fell within the 
border of East Berlin and thus within the bounds of the Warsaw Pact—as its front line 
against German aggression. The censer is decorated around its base and on the chains 
attached to it with dollar signs. The thurible is being swung by a huge hand protruding out 
of an elegant jacket and shirt sleeve with a “US” cufflink. This indicates NATO and West 
Germany in particular are supported by the capitalist greed of the U.S. Indeed, the censer 
is controlled by the disembodied hand, like in Figure 1. 
In the upper right appears a quote from a speech given August 1, 1961, on the eve 
of the construction of the Wall, by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Roughly translated, 
it reads “The aggressive friends of the West with the help of Chancellor Adenauer mobilize 
the material and spiritual forces of Germany to prepare for a third world war.” The caption 
in bold uses an idiomatic expression to describe the U.S. and roughly translated, it reads 
“Washington would not have themselves hurt.”   
 31 
 
Figure 2. NATO Censer Dispenses War. 98F99 
Mark Abramov (1913–1994), a Soviet illustrator and cartoonist, designed artworks 
for magazines like Krokodil as well as newspapers like Pravda. Like other Soviet 
illustrators he created propaganda posters at the TASS studio during the Second World 
War.99F100 Figure 3 is a poster he produced in 1969 with the caption “In the frame of NATO.” 
The text in the bottom left translates as “The Bundeswehr forces numbering half a million 
form the aggressive military core of NATO.” The poster seeks to link the Nazi past with 
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West Germany and NATO and the Bundeswehr which by 1969 was up to strength and well 
integrated in NATO’s force disposition. In addition, it seeks to instill fear of a resurgent 
West Germany and to put a lie to a founding idea of NATO: that the Alliance can integrate 
West Germany and control it from starting a third world war. 100F101 
In the illustration, a massive, ogre-like figure wears the Feldgrau or field-grey 
uniform of the German Wehrmacht. His epaulettes and collar indicate that he is an enlisted 
infantry soldier. At his neck he wears the Iron Cross medal. The helmet is similar to the 
helmet of Hans Speidel in Figure 1. It has plugs emanating from the top of it, like the 
contact spikes of a mine or the horns of a devilish creature. Also present on the helmet is 
the Nazi Hoheitszeichen (eagle and swastika), the national coat of arms in Nazi Germany. 
The uniform, Iron Cross, and Hoheitszeichen would all be recognizable to viewers who 
had memories of the Second World War and would evoke associations with Nazi Germany. 
The effect of his grimace, crossed arms, and with the helmet pulled low to hide his eyes 
both dehumanizes the figure and presents him as a cold, intimidating soldier. 
The German soldier’s bulk is crushing the yellow figures, squeezing them out of 
the frame which his size is also causing to bend and in three of the corners, crack apart. 
The figures representing the other NATO members are depicted in an unflattering manner 
by using yellow and showing writhing hands, feet, and heads with beady eyes and pointy 
noses. Some of the faces depict shock, fear, and sadness (tears). The message here is clear: 
a rearmed West Germany, heir to the Nazi past, is again a danger to Europe. It will 
dominate its NATO allies. Thus, the implication is that the West German Bundeswehr, a 
large and aggressive force, will lead NATO on the offensive. 
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Figure 3. West Germany Fracturing NATO Alliance. 101F102 
Figure 4, is a propaganda poster of the Soviet Union Ministry of Defense, with the 
caption “Unconquerable Barrier.” The creator of the poster and its year of creation are 
unclear with the artist signature unrecognizable and with the decades of the 1950s or 1970s 
suggested for the poster’s creation. However, clues exist that point toward a creator as well 
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as to dating the artwork. While researching this poster, three illustrations that are slight 
variations on what is portrayed in Figure 4 were uncovered.102F103 These other posters are 
attributed to Mark Abramov and date from the late 1960s and into the mid-1970s. It is 
possible Abramov created or contributed to Figure 4. The flags, discussed later, provide 
additional clues to dating the artwork. This piece of propaganda conveys themes including 
the USSR and Warsaw Pact as powerful while unaggressive, NATO as bellicose, and the 
Alliance as an entity driven by U.S. power.  
A gigantic figure in the style of Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible, wearing a medieval 
Russian helmet with a red star, dominates the scene and immediately draws the viewer’s 
attention. This powerful warrior with a chest that appears to be made of stone blocks holds 
a huge shield embossed with the words “Warsaw Treaty.” In his right hand he grasps a 
massive missile representative of the Soviet atomic arsenal. The positioning of these 
implements of war with the shield at the ready and the missile held upright, not pointing at 
the oncoming figure, demonstrate the USSR is not warmongering. Instead it is merely 
preparing to defend against an attack of what is a modern version of the German Order also 
known as the Teutonic Knights. The depiction of this warrior may be a reference to Ilya 
Murometz or Ilya of Murom, a bogatyr and medieval warrior in Russian folklore. 
Numerous descriptions of Ilya note his peasant origins, and this would have made this 
legend especially appealing to CPSU leadership. 103F104 The warrior is illuminated by the 
bright yellow rays of a rising sun comprised of the hammer and sickle symbolizing the 
union of the workers and the peasants. 
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Along the left border of the poster appear from top to bottom flags of seven of the 
eight founding states of the Warsaw Pact. They are the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People’s Republic, the German 
Democratic Republic, the Polish People’s Republic, Socialist Republic of Romania, and 
the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The People’s Republic of Albania was the eighth 
member of the Warsaw Pact. Its flag is omitted as it withdrew from the Warsaw Pact in 
1968. 104F105 This omission, along with the Hungarian tricolor that was approved in 1957, helps 
to date the poster to after 1968.105F106 
In the bottom right, a warrior with a grotesque, goblin-like visage faces the stoic 
Soviet warrior. The figure wears a Germanic medieval helmet, carries a shield emblazoned 
with a swastika, and wields a sword in a shape of a missile inscribed with the word 
“Revanchism.” The depiction of this figure asserts that the FRG is the heir to the aggression 
from the time of the German Order to Operation Barbarossa. A battle axe chipped by 
combat and dripping with blood sticks out of the saddle. The figure sits on a saddle that is 
a map while its “horse” has a head shaped like a bomb with “US” on it. The hoof prints are 
in the shape of bombs with “US” on them. The tail is comprised of bills with dollar signs. 
It implies that the figure is carried by a horse supported by U.S. atomic weapons and 
propelled by capitalism. The NATO figure also seems to be on an incline, as if he has 
ridden across Western Europe, and now cresting the hill faces the might of the USSR and 
Warsaw Pact. Note that all of the colors used are dark and unattractive ones and contrast 
starkly with the bright and vibrant colors used to depict the Soviet warrior, flags, and the 
sun. 
The imagery might evoke in some viewers a comparison of the figure representing 
NATO to Miguel de Cervantes’ Don Quixote. Here, the NATO figure is like Don Quixote 
who imagined windmills to be dangerous giants, thus NATO sees the Warsaw Pact as an 
existential threat and is preparing to foolishly tilt at it. The depiction of the Soviet warrior 
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intends to convey the theme that USSR is not aggressive and yet that the Soviet Union is 
immensely strong compared to NATO. 
 
Figure 4. Heroic Soviet Warrior Holds Off NATO. 106F107 
Alexander Zhitomirsky (1907–1993), was an important Soviet artist and illustrator 
who created cartoons, posters, collages, and photomontages throughout his career.107F108 
According to the curator at the Nailya Alexander Gallery, his propaganda creations were 
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airdropped by Soviet units on Nazi German military units during the Second World War. 
Later, in the 1950s and 1960s his photomontages became well known in the USSR and he 
worked for 42 years at the Soviet Union magazine as its art director.108F109 Zhitomirsky created 
his photomontage, “Hysterical War Drummer,” Figure 5, in 1948. It was published in 
Literaturnaia Gazeta, a weekly political and cultural newspaper, on March 24, 1948.109F110 It 
aims to spread the propaganda themes of the U.S. as warmongering and as an heir to 
fascism.  
Although this work does not mention NATO, it is important to analyze this due to 
President Harry Truman’s connection to the development of NATO and that the 
propaganda themes present in the piece appear in anti-NATO propaganda. NATO did not 
exist when this piece was created. However, this was a time of increasing tensions as the 
Axis-defeating alliance between the Western powers and the Soviet Union collapsed and 
the Cold War started. According to NATO scholar Lawrence Kaplan, while early 
discussions and negotiations regarding an Atlantic alliance were held in secret in the last 
week of March 1948 and then from June until September 1948, there was public indication 
of support for a transatlantic alliance via the Vandenberg amendment in Congress and 
transatlantic statecraft between the UK and U.S. On March 17, 1948, while addressing the 
U.S. Congress, President Harry Truman applauded the signing of the Treaty of Brussels 
that same day and promised that America would assist the self-defense efforts of the 
Brussels Pact. Later, in June 1948, it was announced by Canada, the UK, and the U.S. that 
they were starting talks with founding countries of the Brussels Pact. 110F111 
In Zhitomirsky’s photomontage, Truman appears to look crazed or maniacally 
amused. He sits atop a skyscraper and beats a drum. The figure’s left arm is raised and 
outstretched preparing to deliver another beat. A shadow is cast by the Truman figure, yet 
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it is not him, but a silhouette clearly of Adolf Hitler with his left arm outstretched in the 
Hiltergruß salute. Zhitomirsky’s creation seeks to form a number of ideas in the viewer’s 
mind. First, he links Truman with Hitler and thus with evil. Second, the drum and Truman’s 
beating of it calls to mind the drums used by military units and thus the approach of war. 
Third, placing Truman on top of the building indicates his domination of the world. 
Through the combination of this imagery one is left with the impression that Truman, a 
new Hitler, seeks to engulf the world in war so that he and the U.S. can dominate the globe. 
The juxtaposition of a NATO connected figure with Hitler is not an uncommon theme. It 
will be seen again later in this chapter when discussing Russian Federation anti-NATO 
propaganda. 
 
Figure 5. Soviet Propaganda Links the Beat of the Past to the Present.111F112 
                                                 
112 Source: Alexander Zhitomirsky, Hysterical War Drummer, 1948, Photomontage, 40.2 x 29.8 cm, 
https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:89387/. 
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Soviet artist Boris Efimov (1899–2008) produced a huge body of work for the 
Bolsheviks during his career from the 1918 through the 1990s. According to author 
Stephen Norris, the year 1922 was an important one for Efimov as he moved to Moscow 
and found three jobs that contributed to his rise and provided employment for the rest of 
his career. First, he was given a permanent role at Izvestiia, a daily newspaper, as the 
international affairs cartoonist. He then helped to found Krokodil and joined Ogonek, a 19 PthP 
century Russian literary magazine reestablished by his brother. Efimov created over 35,000 
cartoons for these publications alone. 112F113 Researcher Andrey Lazarev notes that Efimov 
won numerous awards including Stalin Prizes, USSR State Prizes, along with an Order of 
the Red Banner award and an Order of Lenin decoration during a career in which he 
produced hundreds of thousands of pieces of art. 113F114 Efimov recognized the power of 
propaganda. In an interview for a 1999 Public Broadcasting Station television program on 
the Soviet Union called Red Files, Efimov provided some illuminating commentary:  
The role and meaning of propaganda are very great, very great. Propaganda 
was born together with the Soviet regime in 1917, and through all 70 years 
of its existence propaganda helped to consolidate society, held it in some 
kind of unified, strong community. And when the Soviet Union disappeared 
and propaganda disappeared with it, there was left a sort of emptiness. 
Because where, on the one hand, there used to exist one united strong 
propaganda of the Soviet regime, there now exists several propagandas. 
Every group, every party has their own propaganda. All this is confusing. It 
creates some kind of instability. People are disappointed. They don’t know 
who to believe. Now the absence of any kind of unified propaganda is a 
great misfortune for our country. And I hope that there will be a propaganda 
that will propagate truth, decency, legality and kindness. 
And now when people are convinced that this past propaganda carried with 
it so many lies and propagated a lot of things that were not necessary to the 
people. Now when it is gone, and people don’t know what to believe, people 
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think that some kind of propaganda is necessary so that people believe in 
something. 114F115  
Efimov drew this anti-NATO cartoon, Figure 6, in 1969. It aims to influence the 
viewer towards considering NATO as an alliance lacking unity and forcibly held together 
and controlled by the U.S. and Germany. The themes of money and Nazism also appear. 
At the top and in the center a figure wearing glasses and a cowboy hat, likely 
representing President Lyndon B. Johnson, holds ropes in both hands. He appears to be 
grimacing (perhaps from the exertion to control NATO) and looking at the figure to his 
immediate left. This individual is clearly meant to be German with the Iron Cross medal 
and Trachten hat with its feather shaped like a swastika. This might be Ludwig Erhard, 
Federal German Chancellor in the mid-1960s, who was born in Bavaria, served in the 22nd 
Royal Bavarian Artillery Regiment in the First World War, smoked cigars and was central 
to the idea of the FRG social market economy.115F116 This German figure’s facial expression 
gives him the air that of all the figures he is not perturbed. He appears determined and in 
control. Perhaps it is Germany who is really in command, not the U.S. It is telling that the 
figures representing the U.S., France, and the UK are all looking at the German man. The 
Frenchman is a caricature of Charles de Gaulle who served as president from January 1959 
until April 28, 1969. This figure wears a kepi, a type of headgear common in the French 
Army. De Gaulle served as an officer in the French Army and with the Free French Forces 
and there are numerous photos of him in uniform wearing a kepi. He looks toward the 
German and U.S. figures with resentment, a sign of the nuclear and burden-sharing 
problems of the mid-1960s that plagued the Alliance. It is interesting that the character 
representing the UK, possibly an allusion to John Bull, is toward the bottom of the scrum 
compared to the U.S., German, and French figures; has no rope in his hand; and appears to 
have the most worried look of the four main figures.  
                                                 
115 Boris Efimov, RED FILES: Soviet Propaganda Machine - Boris Efimov Interview, 1999, 
https://www.pbs.org/redfiles/prop/deep/interv/p_int_boris_efimov.htm. 
116 Alfred C. Mierzejewski, Ludwig Erhard: A Biography (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2005), 2, 4–5, 173. 
 41 
 
Figure 6. Who is Pulling the Strings in NATO?116F117 
Yuliy Ganf (1898–1973) was an artist who focused on poster illustrations and 
political cartoons. He is best known for his wide body of work published in Krokodil.117F118 
Though the source of the cartoon, Figure 7, does not identify Yuliy Ganf as the artist of the 
cartoon, this was determined based on the signature in the bottom left corner matching 
signatures present on two other works attributed to Yuliy Ganf. In this cartoon, Ganf preys 
upon possible burden-sharing divisions in NATO between European members and the U.S. 
The cartoon plays on the theme of NATO members being vassals of the U.S. and of the 
voracious greed of capitalism. 
In the cartoon a large U.S. major general is wringing money out of his smaller 
NATO allies. The next ones up are in a pot with the words “US NATO PARTNERS” 
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written on the side. They are drawn as caricatures of the nations they represent. To the right 
a factory with a sign reading “Military Industry USA” belches smoke into the air. 
 
Figure 7. U.S. Wringing Money from NATO Allies. 118F119 
The final piece of Soviet propaganda analyzed is a film clip illustrative of the rise 
of the Soviet Navy from the end of the 1960s onward. The still image, Figure 8, of a Soviet 
Sverdlov-class (Project 68bis) cruiser was captured from the film to give the reader a visual 
reference. The subject of the propaganda film is the Soviet Okean-70 naval exercise. 
According to scholar Commander Bruce Watson, USN (ret.), the Soviet Navy rarely 
conducted out-of-area exercises from the start of the Cold War until the mid-1950s and 
when they did, the exercises were short in duration and in numbers of participants. From 
1956 on the exercises grew in size and complexity. Okean-70 was the Soviet Navy’s first 
global exercise, though most of the exercise took place in the North Atlantic and 
Norwegian Sea and included over 200 surface ships and submarines. The USSR 
demonstrated all elements of naval warfare including amphibious landings and coordinated 
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strikes by long range bombers. 119F120 Okean-70 not only provided training for Soviet forces 
and the validation of new equipment and tactics, but it had immense propaganda value. 
The short propaganda video seeks to exploit this. Film footage and photographs of this 
exercise highlight the might of Soviet naval forces and their ability to project coordinated 
power worldwide in order to defeat NATO naval forces and defend the Soviet Union.  
The film opens by introducing four Soviet sailors or marines, one by one and in 
close view, as each stand at attention in front of armored vehicles. The film then shows 
BTR-60 armored personnel carriers (APC) on the move and BTR-50 amphibious APCs 
rolling into Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs). The tempo beings to increase and next we see Tu-
16 strategic bombers flying in formation low over the countryside and bombing an island. 
Now the action has begun, and it follows with displays of firepower from cruisers and 
destroyers, and repeated eruptions as the salvos strike the target. Then Soviet Naval 
Infantry begin assaulting a beach with T-55 main battle tanks, PT-76 amphibious light 
tanks, and infantry on foot. The film cuts to a scene of cheering naval infantry charging 
across a field and ends with a scene of a Soviet Naval Ensign extended by a breeze. 
 
Figure 8. Okean-70 Exercise: USSR Cruisers Fire Main Batteries.120F121 
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B. RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA SINCE 2014 
1. Russian Views on Propaganda 
Russia’s leadership, under the control of President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, 
has restored the role of aggressive mass persuasion and state propaganda. The repression 
of a western-oriented civil society and media in the Russian Federation, especially after 
Putin’s return to power in 2012, cemented this restoration. Similar to the Soviet leadership, 
state propaganda has a vital role internally and externally. Domestically, the Kremlin 
utilizes propaganda to rally popular support for Putin and the government, distract the 
populace from negative events and issues, and marginalize dissenters who themselves had 
a vibrant social media presence to uncover abuses of power by Putin and especially his 
well-heeled oligarch cronies. In the foreign sphere, the Kremlin’s propaganda favorably 
depicts Russia and promotes Putin’s world view of Eurasianism and his opposition to 
postmodern Western values in what is, in a way, a revival of the Holy Alliance or Tsarism. 
The Kremlin also utilizes propaganda to depict NATO as hostile to Russia, and the U.S. 
and Europe as troubled by internal division, decadence, and the betrayal of traditional 
values that are grounded in an organic order of orthodoxy, caste, and obedience. Given 
Putin’s role and power in Russia over the last 20 years, it is important to recognize that his 
experiences in the Soviet Union surely influenced him in an openly authoritarian posture 
and resulted in the widespread usage of propaganda by the Kremlin especially since 2012. 
Putin was born in 1952 in Leningrad amid the immediate postwar reality of the 
besieged northern European metropole. Putin joined the KGB in 1975, where he served for 
approximately 15 years and ultimately witnessed the collapse of the USSR.121F122 He spent 
his early KGB career during the decline of the Brezhnev era, which as noted earlier, was a 
period of torpor in Russia. During this period the Soviets devoted increasing resources to 
the making of war and efforts to both domestic and foreign propaganda as the Cold War 
revived at the end of the 1970s. It was also a period, especially in the late 1970s and into 
the 1980s, of the intense usage of active measures against the West as part of this revival 
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of conflict associated with upheaval in Poland, the INF chapter and the Afghan campaign. 
Thus, Putin’s formative years, personally and professionally, were likely heavily 
influenced by propaganda he experienced as well as techniques he was taught by the KGB. 
It is unlikely Putin has forgotten these experiences or his KGB training of indoctrination 
as the sword of the CPSU and its codex of service in ideological conflict across all domains 
of warfare and statecraft. At a December 2005 social event for the Federal Security Service 
of the Russian Federation (FSB), the domestic successor to the KGB and of which Putin 
had served as the director, Putin told guests, “there is no such thing as a former KGB 
man.” 122F123 Putin has put these formative experiences to use in unleashing propaganda 
domestically and internationally to support his policies and views.  
Domestically, propaganda is viewed as useful to the Kremlin because it has helped 
spread the Kremlin’s mass persuasion particularly when it comes to culture which cannot 
at any time be separated from ideology and nationalism. The application of propaganda to 
spread Putin’s version of a kind of culture with its roots in organic conservatism of the 19 PthP 
century as well as the Russian version of fascism matters because culture plays an 
important role in Putin’s grip on power. The Kremlin has used it to consolidate support for 
Putin and unify society around shared values that are anti-American, anti-EU, anti-NATO, 
and opposed to the regime in Kiev as well. In the early 2000s, the Kremlin encouraged 
nostalgia for the culture of the Soviet past whereas more recently conservative culture and 
values were promoted. As professors Marlene Laruelle and Jean Radvanyi write the 
Kremlin utilized a wave of “cultural nostalgia for the Brezhnev era” to promote unity and 
national sentiment. 123F124 The 2011–2012 protests against Putin and Medvedev by liberal 
elements of the population caused the Putin administration to pivot towards conservatism, 
nationalism and the use of culture as a weapon against those with the western orientation—
an old tactic. Laruelle and Radvanyi note that the Kremlin saw this pivot as a means to 
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sideline the liberal middle classes that formed the core of the protestors while appealing to 
the conservative majority of Russians. The Kremlin began to denounce liberal ideas while 
promoting the Orthodox Church and conservative values. 124F125 Throughout this time Putin 
also turned to nationalism and xenophobia as additional tools to rally Russians together to 
support him. Lipman discusses how during the annexation of Crimea “jingoistic 
propaganda” was widespread on state media and fueled nationalism which helped to boost 
Putin’s approval rating to record levels. 125F126 The Great Patriotic War and the 
memorialization of it are important parts of Putin’s efforts to unify the populace and justify 
the Putin regime’s continued hold on power. According to Dr. Maria Domańska, the 
Kremlin uses the myth of the Great Patriotic War to legitimize its foreign interventions, 
great-power ambitions, and the authoritarian regime itself. 126F127 Professor Elizabeth Wood 
provides another view, that promoting Russia’s role in the Second World War serves to 
highlight the unity of the nation, gives Russia legitimacy and global status, and links Putin 
to this mythic event, thus elevating him to hero status.127F128 The Putin administration uses 
domestic propaganda to convey culture, nationalism, and xenophobia in order to create 
unity and promote a civil society that is fully supportive of the Kremlin. 
The Kremlin views propaganda used in the foreign sphere that advances the 
orthodoxy and tradition agenda in, say, Western and Central Europe to say nothing of the 
extreme right in the U.S. as beneficial. In this way Russia aims to distract the U.S., divide 
NATO and European Union member states, and undermine governments of states in its 
near abroad. Propaganda is also useful in rallying ethnic Russians living in Europe, 
especially in states bordering Russia or even in Germany. For example, with a nod to the 
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pan Slavic ideals of the 19 PthP century, Russia perpetuates the idea that it is the defender of 
ethnic Russians and that only Russia can truly ensure their security. The Kremlin has used 
this old new concept of revanchism in locations such as the Crimea to justify aggression. 
Putin has even pledged to defend ethnic Russians living abroad with any means necessary. 
In July 2014, he made this clear to a conference of Russian Federation ambassadors and 
permanent representatives when he said, “our country will continue to actively defend the 
rights of Russians, our compatriots abroad, using the entire range of available means.” 128F129 
Putin has continued to reiterate this as recently as 2018.129F130 
2. How Russia has Used Propaganda against NATO 
Russia has used propaganda across the spectrum from white via grey to black. This 
fact mirrors the Soviet Union’s employment of all types of propaganda. Also similar to the 
Soviet methods, is that Russia utilizes active measures. Lastly, though from the available 
research the lines of authority and responsibility for propaganda are less clear than in the 
Soviet Union, it is apparent that Putin and his associates retain control over the Russian 
propaganda apparatus. 
In the Russian spectrum of propaganda, the methods adhere to similar divisions 
though new actors have taken the place of or augmented those used by the Soviets. 
Characterizing the type of propaganda (white, grey, or black) still is based on how 
identifiable the source of the message is as well as how truthful it is. Today, white 
propaganda originates from sources such as Sputnik International, part of the Russian state 
media conglomerate Rossiya Segodnya or Russia Today. Rossiya Segodnya was founded 
with the absorption of the successors to Radio Moscow and to APN by a decree of Putin in 
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December 2013.130F131 Another method for spreading white propaganda is through TASS, 
rebranded in 2014 simply to the acronym, which continues to operate as a state news 
agency publishing thousands of articles and photographs annually along with organizing 
press conferences and other events. 131F132 The methods of grey and black propaganda continue 
in the Soviet tradition of using front groups (non-governmental organizations, civil society 
organizations, etc.) and the secret services, but thanks to new communication technologies, 
grey and black propaganda is also spread via extremist and conspiracy websites and blogs 
along with social media platforms. A 2018 RAND Corporation report on Russian 
propaganda on social media explains how black propaganda messaging is generated and 
then migrates to grey propaganda and finally to white propaganda. Then the different types 
utilize “information” or “facts” shared by another to amplify the propaganda. 132F133 Scholars 
Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews contend that though Russian propaganda uses 
Soviet-era methods, there are distinctive features that are new. They write that Russia has 
embraced new communications technology with special verve and great cunning. This 
technology enables the quick and continuous dissemination of partially true (or even false) 
propaganda. The messaging is reinforced by the use of many channels or communication 
paths and a large volume or amount. 133F134 In addition, this propaganda, like in the Soviet era, 
works in conjunction with active measures to influence populations and governments in 
countries of importance to Russia. 
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This resurgence in the use of covert practices falling under the umbrella phrase of 
active measures has not gone unnoticed by researchers the world over. Numerous scholars 
have noted that Russia continues to employ methods that very much resemble the Soviet-
era active measures. Russia expert Keir Giles writes that “Russia has revitalized…the 
Soviet KGB…programme of ‘active measures’.”134F135 Scholar Steve Abrams notes that 
Russia’s use of active measures is not new and instead a “continuation of…Soviet policy, 
itself a reflection of Imperial Russian methods.” 135F136 Though not the focus of this paper, the 
Russian use of active measures such as forgeries or assassinations and the similarities and 
differences to the active measures of the Soviet-era are an important area for further study. 
The apparatus that the Kremlin uses to generate or update, authorize, and spread 
propaganda stretches from Putin through his loyalists and then down to state and private 
entities. Since 2000, Putin’s actions and those of his associates in the realms of Russian 
politics, the economy, and society have ensured Putin’s absolute control of Russia. Of 
particular importance are the combination of sistema and the siloviki that enable Putin’s 
control and his ability to direct the propaganda apparatus.  
Putin uses rent-seeking, corruption, and sistema—a network of connections as 
described by Alena V. Ledeneva—to wed elites in a perverse public-private partnership to 
Putin’s administration. This alliance relies on informal control and loose property rights 
while generating massive rewards for those who play by Putin’s rules. Ledeneva argues 
that sistema in Putin’s Russia provides a lack of transparency that facilitates rent seeking 
and encourages corrupt ties between public and private elites.136F137 Sistema is not new to 
Russia or to Putin. Boris Grozovsky and Maxim Trudolyubov note that in St. Petersburg 
Putin learned the value of weak property rights, patronage, and cooperation with the 
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siloviki.137F138 Those who take part in Putin’s sistema have profited handsomely. Remington 
writes of the compensation of top managers in key industries as well as that of government 
officials. 138F139 Much of this comes from rent-seeking that the Kremlin protects. Another 
benefit of informal control and weak property rights is the ability for connected elites to 
illegally obtain property of those not connected. As scholar Louise Shelley relates, 
corporate raiding is a common practice in Russia where powerful elites use their 
connections to Putin’s administration to turn the instruments of the state against individuals 
in order to force them into selling their property way below market value. 139F140 Putin, with 
control of the state, utilizes sistema and corruption combined with the incentive of vast 
wealth to bind elites to him. 
The second enabler of Putin’s control is composed of the siloviki or security 
officers. These are individuals who have worked for one of Russia’s or the USSR’s security 
agencies. Since leaving this work, though some could still be on active service, they have 
gone into business in Russia or work for the Putin administration. Scholar Andrei Illarionov 
describes the siloviki as having the attitude, motivation, and training to use force without 
reservation against individuals. In addition, they have a powerful allegiance to the siloviki 
group and respect a hierarchy with service in the KGB or FSB putting one at the top. Lastly, 
Illarionov notes that the siloviki occupy a significant percentage of the positions of power 
in the Russian public and private sectors and that this coincided with Putin’s ascent to 
power. 140F141 The siloviki who, like Putin, grew up in the Soviet Union and were trained by 
its security agencies would be well versed in propaganda and active measures and a kind 
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of politics that is anti-civil and suffused with coercion, naked power and aggression against 
the weak and those with a different mind. 
Sistema and the siloviki facilitate Putin’s control of the propaganda apparatus, but 
the bureaucracy uses both written and oral methods for communicating what propaganda 
messages should be spread and what news items should be ignored or downplayed. The 
European External Action Service’s East StratCom Task Force’s flagship project, 
EUvsDisinfo, reports that the Kremlin uses oral instructions known as a temnik. These 
instructions are passed down to subordinates from Kremlin officials in briefings and 
eventually they reach the editors of the Russian media and supervisors of other 
communications outlets. The temnik provide guidance on the themes that should be focused 
on and those that should be ignored. Thus, the intent of the Kremlin is conveyed to the 
lowest levels, with little written record, while providing the editors and workers with some 
creative space to produce propaganda to fit the Kremlin’s messaging. 141F142 Another piece 
describes documents that outline the subjects that are off limits to Russian media. 142F143 A 
2015 TIME piece by reporter Simon Shuster recounts that Margarita Simonyan, the editor 
in chief of the RT network and of Rossiya Segodnya, the state media conglomerate, has a 
telephone on her desk that provides a direct, secure connection to the Kremlin. 143F144 It is clear 
that the Kremlin uses multiple methods to ensure that its propaganda apparatus conveys 
the desired themes and in a coordinated manner while attempting to minimize exposure of 
these methods of control. 
3. The Tools Used by Russia to Disseminate Anti-NATO Propaganda 
In the category of means of propaganda, there are some differences from those of 
the Soviet era. One is that unlike the Soviet state, Russia did not have the same control over 
domestic media in the 1990s and early 2000s which became liberalized and gave rise to 
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civil society as in the West, even if not in power or scope. But this fact has significantly 
changed in the last 15 years as the Russian state has exerted control over domestic media 
and succeeded in penetrating Western society. The signal difference from the Soviet era is 
the emergence of new communications technologies since the collapse of the USSR with 
some of these such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram gaining global popularity only in 
the early 2010s. Russia has incorporated these new means into its propaganda spewing 
machine and they are a critical, new way for Russia to spread its messaging on a scale 
impossible to imagine at the time of the Khrushchev–Nixon debate on colored television 
in July 1959. 
Since Putin’s rise to power the Kremlin has used various means to obtain editorial 
control over Russian media with the objective of silencing dissent and promoting Putin’s 
government. The collapse of the USSR and the rapid privatization of the early 1990s 
affected the Russian media sector. Private media companies emerged and provided an 
alternative to state-controlled media. Scholar Maria Lipman discusses the rise of NTV, the 
first private television network, and notes the immense popularity of its programming 
including Kukly and Itogi. The success of NTV served as an example that other financial 
tycoons emulated by investing in the Russian media sector.144F145 By the 1999–2000 election 
cycle the state no longer had a monopoly on the message.  
After his election, Putin took steps to reverse this as he recognized the importance 
of mass media in influencing the populace and desired to control the messaging. Author 
David Hoffman illustrates this desire by recounting an incident where Putin said he wanted 
to personally run ORT now known as Channel One. 145F146 The Kremlin achieved control of 
the mass media by manipulating the legal system and backing state-owned enterprises in 
takeovers of privately controlled media outlets. Scholar Vladimir Gel’man offers in his 
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book examples of the Kremlin’s tactics. 146F147 Lipman notes that the Kremlin sabotaged two 
attempts to launch privately owned television networks and within a couple years following 
Putin’s election, it had cemented control of the three major TV networks. 147F148 This control 
provides the Kremlin with an echo chamber where the majority of the population is 
exposed to news friendly to Putin and his government while only highlighting negative 
news such as corruption or problems in Russia when it is beneficial to the Kremlin. At the 
same time the populace is kept entertained with TV shows that include messaging in line 
with the Kremlin’s outlook on Russian values. 
Broadcast media is a major means for the Kremlin to spread its propaganda. Along 
with legacy radio and television, communications technologies such as satellite television 
and the internet are used by Russia. Two of the main entities are RT, formerly Russia 
Today, and Sputnik News. The RT news network was formed in 2005 with a single 
internationally broadcast 24/7 news channel. Its motto is “Question More.” Scholar Marcel 
van Herpen details that the Kremlin initially invested $23 million to start RT along with a 
budget of $47 million; by 2011 the budget had grown to $380 million. RT, with a global 
workforce of 1,200, is larger than Fox News. 148F149 From that single news channel RT now 
has eight TV channels broadcasting 24/7 as well as multiple digital platforms. The news 
channels are available in Russian, English, Spanish, Arabic, and French, along with 
German online. Broadcasts are available in over 100 countries. RT claims it garners 100 
million viewers a week across 47 countries, its websites receive 175 million monthly visits, 
and that on YouTube it is the top TV news network with over 10 billion views total across 
its channels. 149F150 RT claims to be an autonomous news organization. However, it does 
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acknowledge that it receives public funding from the Russian government and its editor in 
chief Margarita Simonyan also fills that role at Rossiya Segodnya. 
Sputnik News, part of Rossiya Segodnya, shares propaganda via websites, social 
media platforms, and mobile apps. It also continues the legacy of Radio Moscow and APN 
with its radio broadcasts and newswire services. Sputnik boasts that its radio programming 
amounts to over 800 hours a day via websites, FM and digital audio broadcasts. 150F151 The 
newswire service provides to subscribers over 1,500 pieces daily in English, Chinese, 
Spanish, and Arabic while the photo service adds 700 images a day in addition to Sputnik’s 
extensive image archive. 151F152 Its motto is “Telling the Untold.” Similar to TASS and APN 
and the anonymous propaganda of the Soviet era, many RT and Sputnik articles today lack 
author bylines. 
Print publications (newspapers, paid supplements, etc.) continue to be a means for 
Russia to spread propaganda. TASS, the newswire agency, has over 2,000 employees 
spread across offices in the Russian Federation and 63 branches in 60 countries. 
Subscribers to TASS have access to 1,500 news pieces and over 500 images and videos a 
day. 152F153 Scholar Kohei Watanabe finds that TASS coverage of the crisis in Ukraine (2013–
2014) had a clear bias to covering themes and news consistent with those favored by the 
Kremlin. 153F154 Herpen points out that a website, “Russia beyond the Headlines” was launched 
in 2007 by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, the official gazette of the Russian government. This site 
oversaw the publication of paid newspaper supplements. These eight-page supplements 
appeared monthly in major Western newspapers. 154F155 In 2017, the website was transferred 
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to the parent company for RT, the printed supplements ceased, and the title was shorted to 
Russia Beyond. 155F156 It advertises itself as a guide to Russian culture, travel, business, and 
more. 156F157 
Communications via social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, 
and Instagram factor heavily into Russian propaganda efforts. They are a primary means 
of spreading grey and black propaganda. As a 2018 RAND Corporation report concludes, 
Russia coordinates its broadcast, print, and web news propaganda efforts with its social 
media presence. 157F158 
Film, like in the USSR, continues to be an important means of propaganda. Recent 
works such as The Brest Fortress (2010), Battle for Sevastopol (2015), Panfilov’s 28 Men 
(2016), T-34 (2019), and The Balkan Line (2019) work to further spread propaganda 
themes regarding the Great Patriotic War or NATO. Some of these works are based on 
historical events whereas others claim to be but are actually fabricated myths dating back 
to the Soviet era.158F159 These films disseminate the propaganda domestically but are also 
available globally via internet entertainment streaming services. These services provide a 
greater reach and audience for Russian films than would have been available to the Soviet 
propaganda apparatus. 
Military parades, like in Soviet times, play a propaganda role in conveying the 
martial power of the Russian Federation. In addition, as Putin has placed greater emphasis 
on celebrating the Soviet sacrifice and victory in the Second World War the military 
parades have placed renewed focus on it. In January 2019, Russia received a shipment of 
functioning T-34 tanks from Laos that will be incorporated into future Second World War 
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victory commemorations. 159 F160 In November 2019, the Kremlin held a military parade to re-
enact the defense of Moscow in 1941. 160F161 
4. Russia’s Views of NATO 
The Kremlin’s positions regarding the EU and NATO are rooted in Russian 
policymakers’ Hobbesian view of international relations, their belief in Russia’s great 
power status, and emotional responses that guide statecraft to perceived slights. As Lo 
writes, Russian leaders view the world as a zero-sum game where the strong do what they 
want and the weak suffer. In this dangerous world hard power matters more than soft power 
though Russia does utilize the latter in terms of political, economic, and information 
resources as leverage to achieve its objectives. Lastly, Russian leaders see the international 
system dominated by major powers not international institutions. 161F162 Lo argues that 
Kremlin policymakers view Russia as a great power that is resuming its rightful place 
among the leading nations of the world. 162F163 This is evidenced in then-President Medvedev’s 
comments in 2008 where he described a unipolar world as unacceptable, advocated for a 
multi-polar system, and asserted that Russia has its own sphere of influence.163F164 More 
recently, in 2018, President Putin in his annual address to the Russian Federal Assembly 
referred to Russia as ranking “among the world’s leading nations.” 164F165 On an emotional 
level, as Lo writes, Russia reacts negatively and defensively to its loss of control and 
influence over Central and Eastern European states that it had before the collapse of the 
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USSR. 165F166 This emotional response also stems from the perceived humiliation of Russia by 
the West during the 1990s and early 2000s. 166F167 In President Putin’s aforementioned 2018 
speech there is a strong sense of this emotion as he describes new strategic weapons 
developed in response to the U.S. ignoring Russia’s concerns over missile defense systems. 
He states that, “nobody really wanted to talk to us about the core of the problem, and 
nobody wanted to listen to us. So listen now.” 167F168 
For the Kremlin, NATO is not a direct military threat, but an embodiment of a 
unipolar world that that excludes Russia and is inimical to Russia’s preferred international 
system. Lo writes that Russia sees NATO in the context of a broader danger to “Russia’s 
sovereignty, its geopolitical position, and the stability of the Putin system itself.” 168F169 The 
main issue is that NATO can act without Russian consent. Lo and Allison agree in their 
observation that for Putin the only legitimate authorization of the use of force comes not 
from NATO or the EU, but from the UN Security Council where Russia has the right of 
veto.169F170 Russia’s view of NATO is also influenced by the humiliation narrative and the 
belief that NATO cannot be trusted. The Russian government maintains that NATO 
promised the Soviets at the end of the Cold War not to expand into Central and Eastern 
Europe.170F171 The NATO expansion begun in 1999, NATO’s bombing campaign in the 
Kosovo War without a UN mandate, and NATO’s refusal to consider Russia’s proposal for 
a pan-European ballistic missile defense system all provided Russia with evidence that 
NATO was disingenuous and did not respect a weakened Russia. Laruelle and Radvanyi 
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point out that Russia saw NATO’s expansion toward Russia “as one of a succession of 
humiliations made possible by the country’s temporary weakness.” 171F172 Lo provides 
additional insight into the Russia outlook when he writes that a characteristic of a great 
power is that it is “dominant player” in its near abroad. 172F173 Thus, it is not surprising that 
Russia would react strongly to perceived interference in its sphere of influence by the West 
via NATO expansion. 
5. Russia’s Goals for Anti-NATO Propaganda 
The Russian aims of anti-NATO propaganda are similar to those of the Soviets. 
Through its propaganda Russia seeks to weaken public support for NATO, divide the 
NATO Alliance, enable Russian policies, and cast Russia in a positive light. There are the 
additional goals of distracting the U.S. and creating more favorable conditions in Russia’s 
near abroad (i.e., former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact nations that the Soviets had 
occupied or effectively controlled). 
6. Common Themes in Russia’s Anti-NATO Propaganda 
The themes in Russian anti-NATO propaganda continue some of the Soviet 
messaging while introducing new ones. Like in Soviet anti-NATO propaganda, Russian 
propaganda casts NATO as an offensive and aggressive alliance that at a minimum 
condones fascism, if not directly supports it. Other themes borrowed from the Soviets 
include portraying NATO as the vassal of a warmongering U.S. and showing Russia as 
acting in self-defense and in the interests of peace. One new theme focuses on portraying 
NATO as an untrustworthy partner for reneging on an alleged promise not to expand into 
Central and Eastern Europe. Russia continues to claim that NATO made such a 
commitment to Soviet leadership at the end of Cold War. Another new theme showcases 
Russia as the only willing protector of ethnic Russians everywhere.  
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7. Russian Visual Propaganda Analysis 
This section analyzes a number of pieces of anti-NATO propaganda utilized by the 
Russian Federation to further its agenda. The anti-NATO propaganda generated by the 
Russian Federation is the successor to that created by the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War. In Russian propaganda targeting NATO the message may contain different 
individuals, different topics, and different means of dissemination, yet its connection to 
propaganda of the Soviet era is apparent. Russia’s strong tradition of using the fine arts in 
the service of propaganda continues. It is displayed in the following cartoons/memes and 
drawings aimed at NATO and produced for Russian newspapers, magazines, and internet 
media. In addition, Russian propaganda photographs and videos play an important role and 
are widely circulated in Russian internet newspapers and broadcasts and in turn throughout 
the world. A couple of examples are discussed in this section. 
 Vitaliy Podvitsky (1972– ) is a Russian illustrator and cartoonist. According to 
Sputnik and Podvitsky’s website, he has worked in journalism for more than 25 years and 
has created over 10,000 illustrations and cartoons. His work is published regularly by RIA-
Novosti and Sputnik, both part of Russian state media conglomerate Rossiya Segodnya.173F174 
In 2016 three of Podvitsky’s cartoons focused on NATO. The first cartoon, Figure 
9, appeared on April 19, 2016, on Ria.ru and again on June 30, 2016, on a Russian operated 
website, Military Review or TopWar.ru. According to researcher Fatima Tlis, TopWar.ru 
website is controlled by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and is part of a 
public relations program. 174F175 Via a reverse image search, it can also be found on multiple 
other webpages, many of which support Russian views. The June 30, 2016, publication 
accompanied an article describing NATO exercises around Poland, the Baltic countries, 
and Baltic Sea. It emphasizes the large number of forces involved, claims that NATO has 
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a habit of scaring Europeans with talk of an exaggerated Russian threat, states that there 
were multiple equipment problems and accidents, and highlights local protests against the 
NATO exercises. 175F176  
The cartoon, targeted toward a Russian/Russian friendly audience, seeks to 
reinforce in the viewer’s mind that NATO is expansive and aggressive while associating 
Russia with non-interference in other’s affairs though there are clear reminders of Russia’s 
power. In Figure 9, a bear, representing Russia, was relaxing and reading a newspaper 
perhaps in its garden, but now has leaned forward and is warily looking west towards 
Europe. It is concerned with NATO, represented as an aggressive and invasive ivy with 
dark blue leaves that has spread across Europe and is beginning to encircle the flanks of 
Russia’s “garden.” This element supports the Kremlin’s narrative that NATO broke a 
commitment not to expand NATO to former Warsaw Pact states and that NATO’s goal is 
to encircle Russia. Behind the bear sits a compost heap that contains the remains of 
previous invasive ivy vines that the bear has chopped off with its sharp hoe. These severed 
vines call to mind great Russian victories following invasions of Russia. They are the defeat 
of Nazi Germany as portrayed by a vine with leaves with a swastika and “1945” on them; 
the defeat of Napoleonic France as evidenced by a vine with “1812” on it; the vine with 
“1709” on it recalls the decisive victory over the Swedish Empire at the Battle of Poltava;  
the tactical victory at the Battle of Moscow over forces of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth as shown by the “1612” and what appears to be a helm of a Polish Hussar; 
and lastly the famous Battle on the Ice, the victory of Prince Alexander Nevsky and his 
forces over Teutonic knights as indicated by the “1242” and the horned helm. 
                                                 




Figure 9. Russian Bear Warily Watches NATO’s Encircling Vines. 176F177 
One of Podvitsky’s cartoons, Figure 10, aimed at the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit 
appeared on Sputnik on July 8, 2016. It accompanies a short body of text that claims NATO 
is using the Warsaw Summit to focus on an imaginary Russian threat. Further the text states 
that NATO is the cause of instability in Europe, citing a Turkish general, and that European 
states would prefer to arm themselves than contribute more to the Alliance due to a lack of 
faith in NATO. 177F178 Using a Google reverse image search, the cartoon can also be found on 
multiple other webpages, again many of them promoting Russian views. The cartoon’s 
themes are of a bellicose NATO, a peaceful Russia, and that NATO does not serve 
European interests. The cartoon is aimed at a wide audience based on its use of English in 
the text and distribution via the internet. 
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Figure 10. NATO Ignores the True Threats to Europe.178F179 
The scene is a seascape with three individuals struggling in the water. They are 
depicted encircled by three sharks with another in pursuit. The sharks symbolize threats to 
Europeans. The threats as indicated by text on the dorsal fin or right next to it are: 
“CRISIS,” “TERRORISM,” “MIGRANTS,” and “BREXIT.” They are appealing to a 
NATO general or admiral for rescue. He stands safely above them on his ship and instead 
of rendering aid lectures them about Russia with a speech balloon in the reading: “NO, 
NO, NO! THIS IS YOUR REAL THREAT!” The sail on the mast depicts a weird sea 
creature with the body and tentacles of an octopus, the claws of a lobster or crab, horns, 
and a fearsome maw. It evokes the fantastical sea beasts that mariners in centuries past 
claimed inhabited the oceans. 
The message is clear: that NATO (the officer) is out of touch with Europeans (the 
adrift people) and ignores the real security concerns (the sharks). NATO does not want to 
address the real threats and instead wants to focus on the imagined threat of Russia (the 
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mythical sea monster). Further, it implies that Europeans should not trust NATO to aid 
them when in distress and need to look elsewhere to address their security concerns. 
The second Podvitsky cartoon, Figure 11, published on July 14, 2016, accompanied 
a Military Review (TopWar.ru) article that claims the NATO Warsaw Summit spread lies 
about Russia, and similar rhetoric was heard from Hitler before the Nazi German invasion 
of Russia. The author claims the U.S. is the puppeteer controlling all this and compares 
numerous officials in Poland and Ukraine to fascists. 179F180 Though the article is available in 
English, given the Russian language in the speech bubbles the target audience is Russian 
speaking. Similar to the two previous images, a Google reverse image search uncovers this 
cartoon on many Russian language webpages as well as English language blogs espousing 
Russian views. The cartoon carries on the visual theme of Soviet propaganda, that NATO 
is a fascist organization and heir to the Hitlerites. 
  
Figure 11. NATO Embodies the Nazi German Past. 180F181 
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The cartoon depicts NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg speaking at a 
podium to an audience. He appears to be waving to the crowd with a raised right arm. 
However, what appears to be an innocent gesture is made much more sinister by the 
apparition of Hitler on Stoltenberg’s left and to his rear. Hitler with an intense look is giving 
the Hiltergruß salute. Now Stoltenberg’s gesture takes on a whole new meaning. It is now 
noticeable that Stoltenberg is dressed similar to Hitler with the same color suit, shirt, and 
tie. Where Hitler is drawn with an intense and maniacal gaze Stoltenberg appears goofier 
with his eyes crossed. This might fit with the article that describes Stoltenberg as a puppet 
of his American deputy. Two of the audience members are talking and one asks, “What is 
it about?” and the other replies “All about the same….” The attempt is to clearly connect 
NATO with Nazi Germany. 
Sharzh I Pero or Cartoon and Feather is a satirical newspaper that emerged in 2015. 
According to reporter Anna Malpas it was founded by pro-Putin Russians connected to the 
anti-Maidan movement as a response to France’s Charlie Hebdo in order to counteract 
liberalism and an anti-Russian bias in Western media. It started as a weekly newspaper 
available free of charge in Moscow. 181F182 However, other reports indicate its publication is 
irregular and nothing has been posted to its Twitter and Instagram accounts since May 
2017. Scholar John Etty writes that the creators of Sharzh I Pero view the paper as a 
spiritual successor to Krokodil.182F183 The editors of Sharzh I Pero state that they “want our 
pen to be equal to bayonet.”183F184 
This graphic, Figure 12, was published in the magazine Sharzh I Pero in April 2016 
and directed at a Russian reading audience. Sharzh I Pero, along with this image, posted 
to Twitter and Instagram four additional cartoons critical of NATO between April 7 and 
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13, 2016. This was right after the 49 PthP anniversary of the founding of NATO and while 
NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg met with President Obama in Washington, DC.184F185 
One of these posts included the caption: “The names of NATO operations and exercises 
have peaceful names, but in essence, they were cruel and bloody.” The symbols and caption 
of the graphic are designed to connect NATO with warmongering and hypocrisy as well as 
remind the viewer of NATO’s 1999 Operation Allied Force, the bombing campaign of 
Yugoslavia, that is still controversial in Russia. 
Depicted in the image is an angel with the NATO logo as its head, its torso is 
camouflaged, and its wings are covered with bombs. The image would reinforce the beliefs 
of individuals who already thought NATO had massacred many innocent people in 
Yugoslavia. and influence others to this belief. The caption reads “Merciful Angel.” 
According to researcher Elena Voinova, this refers to a Serbian mistranslation in 
Yugoslavia of the NATO operation name (or the U.S. name, Operation Noble Anvil).185F186 
Internet searches for “Operation Merciful Angel” return multiple hits, most from Serbian 
websites or pro-Russian forums. The poster exchanges the idea of a merciful angel for the 
Angel of Death.  
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Figure 12. A NATO Angel Brings Destruction. 186F187 
The World Peace Council (WPC), a front organization during the Cold War for the 
Soviet Active Measures campaign against NATO, continues its support today of Russian 
Federation propaganda efforts. In April 2016, the WPC posted on its website a policy 
statement and links to two posters calling for a global day of protest during the July 2016 
NATO Warsaw Summit. The WPC’s lengthy position statement calls NATO “an enemy 
of peace and the people” and provides paragraphs of claims seeking to back this accusation 
up. One such claim is that NATO contributed to the U.S. and EU efforts to violently 
overthrow Ukraine’s government in 2014. The WPC goes on to justify Russian 
involvement as mere support to those who “in the face of violence and fascism, people of 
eastern and southern Ukraine took action to protect their lives, cultures and history, 
communities and interests.” The WPC writes that the Warsaw Summit is a critical 
opportunity to expand its existing campaign, Yes to Peace! No to NATO! The ultimate 
                                                 




goal is “the dissolution of NATO at a global level” in order to counter this “key tool of 
imperialist domination of the globe.” 187F188 
The poster, Figure 13, is designed to connect in the viewer’s thought that NATO is 
aggressive, warmongering, and seeks to dominate the world. The WPC posters differ from 
Soviet era posters in that they are montages of color photographs, not renderings by artists, 
and they are distributed primarily on the internet. The WPC poster engages the eye with 
bright dynamic colors. NATO’s logo is superimposed over the Arabian Peninsula and the 
logo encircles most of the Middle East, Southern Europe, and Russia. It is juxtaposed 
against a soldier wearing a uniform in the Universal Camouflage Pattern, formerly issued 
by the U.S. Army in the early 2000s. The soldier’s M4 carbine is pointed towards Syria on 
the map and he has just fired a round. The soldier is in the right front of the poster in the 
most dominant position. Picasso’s “Dove of Peace” is positioned on the front lower corner 
of the poster. This delicate image is featured in contrast to the menacing figure of a soldier 
with a powerful weapon and NATO smothering a large portion of the world. 
                                                 





Figure 13. WPC NATO Warsaw Summit Protest Poster.188F189 
The photograph, Figure 14, is part of a RT online article that was published on the 
15th anniversary of the commencement of NATO’s air campaign over Yugoslavia. The 
piece is largely pictorial with a brief introduction and then 15 photos and their captions. 
The focus is the photographs that are all meant to convey or reinforce the Russian narrative 
that NATO was the aggressor, killed thousands of civilians, and refused offers of a 
ceasefire. The propaganda theme of NATO being a tool of the U.S. is also included as a 
reference is made to the NATO operation being conducted to further U.S. interests. There 
is no mention of the Serbian oppression of the Kosovar Albanians or why NATO launched 
Operation Allied Force.189F190 The photograph selected is of a funeral and it is captioned 
“However, the so-called “humanitarian intervention” killed 2,000 civilians.” The photo and 
its caption are used by RT in contrast with NATO’s statement that it only bombs military 
targets and President Clinton’s reference to the campaign as a humanitarian intervention. 
The photo contributes to the Russian narrative portraying NATO as a warmonger and the 
victimizer of an innocent Yugoslavia.  
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Figure 14. The Human Cost of NATO’s Bombing of Yugoslavia. 190F191 
The final piece of Russian propaganda analyzed is a short film clip published on 
July 29, 2018, to YouTube by the Ruptly video news agency, part of the RT news network. 
The film is a montage of shots depicting the parade of the Russian Black Sea Fleet at 
Sevastopol in honor of Russia’s Navy Day. Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev 
attended while Putin observed the larger naval parade held in St. Petersburg. 191F192 According 
to the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Sevastopol parade included over 4,000 service 
members manning more than 80 surface ships, submarines, aircraft, and various armored 
vehicles and amphibious craft. 192F193 The film as a propaganda piece exudes themes of 
Russian strength, naval power, and connections to a glorious past. This video is quite 
appealing. It is fast paced and upbeat with significant action and dynamic closeup shots. 
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The weather provides a brilliant setting for the film with a cloudless, sunny day. There is a 
strong breeze so the colored pennants and military flags flutter in the wind against a 
beautiful blue sky.  
Figure 15 is a still captured from the film. In the foreground stands in formation a 
Russian Navy honor guard and band. Behind them sails the Russian state Sail Training 
Ship Mir, while a Russian submarine (Kilo or improved Kilo class) and a Rubin class 
offshore patrol ship of Coast Guard of the Border Service of the FSB lie at anchor with a 
19PthP century fortification of the port in the background. 
 
Figure 15. Celebrating Navy Day with New Technology and Old Glory. 193F194 
The viewer is shown Russia’s naval power and capabilities throughout the film. As 
is traditional, the fleet commander in his launch passes by a variety of moored warships 
with the crews in dress white uniforms at attention on deck. These warships include some 
of Russian Navy’s latest warships such as the Buyan-M class corvette and Admiral 
Grigorovich class frigate as well as old combatants like the Krivak II class frigate Slava 
class cruiser. Throughout the video, the capabilities, the breadth of equipment and 
manpower of the Russian Federation Navy are impressively demonstrated. There is a 
closeup of a torpedo being launched from a Grisha class anti-submarine corvette, rockets 
firing from a Ropucha class LST, and of multiple rockets launched from BM-21 “Grad” 
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vehicles firing from positions on a jetty. The Krasnodor, an improved Kilo class submarine, 
fills the frame as it glides through the water mysterious, sleek, and threatening. Fighter 
aircraft scream overhead as attack helicopters pass over. Views of the sailors and officers 
in their white uniforms on the welcoming pier and on the ships demonstrate the Russian 
Navy’s polish. At another moment Russian Naval Infantry fire off machine guns and then 
conduct hand to hand combat drills while orange smoke from smoke grenades swirls 
around them. The film like the Soviet one discussed in Figure 8 closes with an LST 
releasing a stream of amphibious assault vehicles into the water. 
The shots in the film remind the viewer of Russia’s history and naval glory. Early 
shots show a group in 18 PthP century attire passing the naval honor guard. The lead figures, 
wearing the blue sash of the Order of St. Andrew established by Peter the Great, represent 
Catherine the Great and her escort Prince Grigory Potemkin. Potemkin played an important 
role in the Russian history of Sevastopol including the conquest of Crimea, development 
of the harbor, and building the Black Sea Fleet. 194F195 Two monuments related to the military 
defense of Sevastopol are focused on during shots in the film: The Monument to the Sunken 
Ships and The Soldier and Sailor Monument. The former was built in the bay in 1905 to 
commemorate the Imperial Russian Navy ships sunk in the defense of Sevastopol during 
the siege of 1854–1855. The latter monument is a more recent one and celebrates the 
defenders of Sevastopol during the 1941–1942 siege that earned the city the “Hero City” 
honor from Stalin and the liberators of Crimea in May 1944. The monument shots remind 
viewers of Russia’s sacrifice in defending Sevastopol from foreign aggression. 
This film was produced to emphasize important themes including the following: 
the connection of Russia today to the time of Peter the Great and the Russian Empire, that 
Russia once again has a powerful navy, that Russia and Sevastopol are inseparable, and 
that Russian Navy is equipped to successfully defend Russian territory near the Black Sea 
as did their forebears in the Great Patriotic War. 
                                                 




The Russian Federation is and will continue to be a formidable opponent for 
NATO. The value of propaganda was recognized by the founders of the Soviet Union, and 
during the Cold War the Soviet leadership relied heavily on propaganda in its effort to 
undermine NATO. Posters, cartoons, and other visual messaging played a significant part 
in the Soviets’ effort. More recently, the Russian Federation has continued in this tradition 
while investing considerable resources in diverse but coordinated media channels to 
portray NATO in graphic terms as an aggressor and a tool of the United States. 
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III. NATO: INFORMATION SERVICE TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
Chapter III shifts the focus from Russian and Soviet propaganda efforts to NATO’s 
propaganda and information operations that have worked to bolster the alliance and counter 
anti-NATO propaganda. 
The chapter opens with a section that provides an overview of NATO’s Cold War 
public information efforts. This includes a look at NATO’s perspective on propaganda as 
well on the Soviet Union. In addition, the methods, means, goals, and themes of NATO 
propaganda are briefly examined. This section closes with an analysis of seven pieces of 
visual propaganda created and disseminated by NATO during the Cold War. 
Following this look at NATO Cold War propaganda efforts, the focus shifts to 
NATO’s post 2014 propaganda operations. This portion of the chapter is laid out in a 
similar fashion to the previous in order for the reader to compare and contrast NATO 
propaganda efforts during the Cold War and in the past decade. Lastly, eight pieces of 
propaganda are presented and analyzed to draw attention to the themes and messaging 
present. 
The chapter concludes with a short section that highlights observations and critical 
points noted earlier in the chapter. The focus here is on lessons learned from NATO’s Cold 
War propaganda efforts and how or if they are being applied today. This will help to answer 
the questions asked in Chapter I. 
A. NATO INFORMATION EFFORTS DURING THE COLD WAR 
1. NATO Views on Propaganda 
NATO took a different approach to propaganda than the Soviet Union. NATO 
leadership recognized that the Soviet Union wielded a massive propaganda apparatus 
against the Alliance. In addition, they acknowledged that the USSR had advantages when 
it came to propaganda. In 1959, NATO Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak wrote that:  
The USSR makes the utmost use of a weapon of which she is a master – 
propaganda. In this, too, she often has the advantage of us. The Western 
nations, we must admit, are often slow to react. Furthermore, since their 
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policy is aimed at a positive and balanced solution, it generally leads them 
to adopt fairly complex attitudes which are poor material for propaganda. 
The USSR, on the contrary, is in a position to react rapidly. Since her object 
is to hustle her adversaries and put them on their guard, she can resort to the 
over-simplified and spectacular formula which catches the imagination of 
the masses, such as: “Ban the atom bomb!” , “German rearmament means 
war!,” “Colonialist exploitation is the curse of the underdeveloped 
countries!,” etc.195F196  
The question was how to react. According to Risso, the governments of the 
democratic nations of the West were at a disadvantage because postwar they had 
significantly reduced the propaganda apparatuses built up to rally their populations to 
victory in the Second World War. Further she argues that this was due to the view in the 
West that propaganda was viewed in a negative light, a tool of dictators, and that 
democracies should not resort to its use in peacetime. 196F197 There were debates within NATO 
on the proper course, compromises were reached, and NATO information campaigns were 
carried out throughout the Cold War. In 1959, Lord Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary 
General, wrote of these compromises noting that NATO’s Information Service is limited 
to creation and coordination of information campaigns to bolster the Alliance. It is up to 
national information services to fully implement the programs. In addition, NATO could 
be a forum for consultations on psychological warfare or counterpropaganda, but the 
consultations would be limited to situations impacting Alliance members. NATO would 
not carry out propaganda campaigns against the USSR or Warsaw Pact nations. 197F198 Of note 
are the different terms used by NATO of information, propaganda, and psychological 
warfare. Osgood provides illumination as to the usage of these different terms. He writes 
that Western governments used these terms interchangeably, except in public where they 
described the NATO and national propaganda efforts as information. 198F199 In this chapter, 
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the terms propaganda and information are used interchangeably with the understanding 
that they are the same in this context. 
2. NATO Methods of Propaganda 
As to where on the propaganda spectrum NATO Cold War propaganda falls, unlike 
the Soviet Union’s efforts, it is predominantly of the white type. The utilization of grey and 
black types of propaganda was left to the purview of the national information agencies such 
as the United States Information Agency (USIA). According to Osgood, the USIA stressed 
grey types of propaganda to covertly boost support for NATO while weakening that for 
communism. 199F200  
In early 1950, NATO leadership decided to “promote and coordinate public 
information in furtherance of the objectives of the Treaty while leaving responsibility for 
national programs to each country.”200F201 By the fall of 1950 NATO propaganda efforts were 
led by NATIS. A small staff led by a Director of Information were tasked with promoting 
accurate, unclassified information on NATO. 201F202 The annual budget of NATIS in the early 
1950s was around £35,000. 202F203 Given the small annual budget NATIS found itself relying 
on assistance from national information services throughout the Cold War. In September 
1953, the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations (CICR) was formed through 
the merger of two earlier working groups. The CICR was charged to advise the North 
Atlantic Council (NAC) on how to increase public support for NATO via information and 
culture through either collective action or that of individual member states. The CICR’s 
responsibilities included reporting on Soviet anti-Western propaganda. 203F204 According to 
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Risso, though the CICR oversaw NATIS, they worked cooperatively to bolster the Alliance 
through the dissemination of information. 204F205 Though NATIS created and provided 
information products to support the Treaty it is clear that there was a lack of coordination 
amongst the national information services. This was probably compounded by the Alliance 
believing that “the important task of explaining and reporting NATO activities rests 
primarily on national Information Services.” 205F206  
3. NATO Means of Propaganda 
Throughout the Cold War, NATO utilized various means of communications to 
convey its public information campaigns to the masses. Some were modified or even 
phased out of usage over the decades due to cost or views of how effective a certain form 
of communications was. In many cases they also required the support and cooperation of 
the member nations to execute them. These means included exhibitions (both mobile and 
static), publications, film, private associations, and visits to NATO headquarters. A brief 
overview of them provides the reader with an appreciation for the limited nature of 
NATO’s efforts. 
Exhibitions were one of the early means of advertising NATO’s purpose and its 
role in each of the Alliance states. In the late 1940s and early 1950s the main means of 
communication was the radio and the newspaper, and access might be limited for those in 
rural areas. In 1951, the concept originated for a traveling exhibition that would tour the 
countries of the Alliance. 206F207 According to Risso, the program was inspired by the traveling 
exhibitions of the Marshall Plan that toured Europe to showcase the virtues of that recovery 
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effort and to convey that it was not a tool of American imperialism. 207F208 The NATO program 
started modestly and was funded by the U.S. The trailers contained exhibits reminding the 
viewer of the peace achieved in 1945, the Soviet aggression in the late 1940s, and thus the 
need for NATO. 208F209 In the 1950s these exhibition trailers called the “Caravan of Peace” 
were visited by over 10 million individuals during stops at 550 locations in nine Alliance 
countries. Eventually due to concerns over costs the traveling exhibition caravans were 
downsized to a mix of static exhibitions and “Mobile Information Centre (MIC).” 209F210 The 
sale of the caravan equipment enabled the purchase of two buses, the MICs, that provided 
classroom space and the ability to project indoor and outdoor films (for a larger 
audience).210F211 According to Risso and NATO, the two MICs toured throughout the 1960s 
and were continually in demand by member nations, but by 1970 with the spread of 
television and the population size of the Alliance it was deemed not cost effective to 
continue using the MICs. 211F212 
NATO created and disseminated various types of print publications throughout the 
Cold War ranging from posters to reports. Commemorative postage stamps were designed 
and issued by NATO and Alliance members with the first issued by Portugal and the U.S. 
in 1952. 212F213 Even stickers were made promoting NATO as “insurance for peace.”213F214 A vast 
amount of publications were produced by NATO during the Cold War. Director of NATIS 
Joseph Phillips writes that in 1958 alone more than a million copies of various publications 
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were produced and distributed across the Alliance. 214F215 According to Risso the publications 
tended to fall into three categories: those generated for the general public, those for the 
national information services and selected individuals, and those for dissemination within 
the CICR. The publications for the first group usually targeted a specific group such as 
Alliance troops in training or students but could be shared with a wider audience and the 
key points of the messaging could be easily understood by anyone. The second type of 
publications was meant to assist in the coordination of messaging related to NATO between 
NATIS and the national information services. It was factual but due to the intended 
audience it was written in a manner that necessitated restrictions on its distribution. The 
last type of publications was reports providing information on national and international 
communist parties and organizations. They were secret and gave national delegations and 
trusted contacts background information that could be used indirectly in the generation of 
messaging at the national levels. 215F216    
Film was an important means for NATIS to disseminate messaging bolstering the 
Alliance. According to Risso, NATIS produced these short films in cooperation with 
national information services especially the United States Information Agency (USIA). 216F217 
The films were generally short and served to explain NATO’s role, value, as well as inform 
viewers about the member states of NATO. Throughout the Cold War, films were a means 
to inform Allied military personnel on the exercises and operations of their fellow NATO 
service members such as Northern Flank or Four Days in Autumn.217F218 In the 1950s, a series 
of films called the Atlantic Community – Know your Allies was made for just this 
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purpose. 218F219 The short films include shots of everyday life in urban and rural areas while 
the narrator describes the life, culture, and history of the nation. The contributions of the 
nation to the Atlantic Community militarily, politically, and economically are 
highlighted. 219F220 In the 1960s NATIS produced films promoting the economic and political 
benefits of NATO membership. Films such as Europe: Two Decades and Two Worlds – 
Twenty Years, a comparison of Belgium and Czechoslovakia, show the progress Europe 
has made since the Second World War and subtly link economic recovery and political 
freedom to NATO. 220F221 In 1983 NATIS released Barriers to educate a new generation. The 
film narrated by Charlton Heston discusses post war European history, highlights the 
militaristic expansion and domineering nature of the USSR, and characterizes NATO as 
the “very hub of global stability, which has grown from courage, determination, and a 
steadfast application of human values.” 221F222 
Lastly, NATO worked to spread its messaging via private associations and visits to 
NATO’s headquarters. Throughout the Alliance private associations generated support for 
NATO and promoted the idea of uniting militarily, politically, and economically to form a 
powerful Atlantic community. Phillips notes that “the private associations in support of 
NATO…do excellent work.”222F223 These voluntary organizations were an important 
supplement to NATIS and the Alliance states’ national information services in promoting 
the role and value of NATO to the public. 223F224 NATO Visits were an important way to 
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showcase NATO in person. Phillips writes that 10,000 people visited NATO HQ in 1959 
alone. These visits were not paid for by NATO. The people, from individuals to civic 
groups to business associations and beyond, came to learn more about the Alliance. They 
received briefings from NATO officials and participated in discussions pertaining to the 
Alliance. 224F225 Risso notes that from the 1960s onward on average 12,000 people visited 
NATO HQ annually. 225F226   
4. View of the USSR as Conveyed in NATO Publications 
The Alliance viewed the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies as a military and 
political threat to the liberal democratic order of the West. This view was informed not 
only by the actions of the USSR in the second half of the 1940s but also by the rhetoric and 
actions of the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. NATO publications characterize the 
Soviet Union as well its actions in a number of ways. Soviet values are not Western values. 
One NATO publication states that Communism “like any dictatorship, cannot tolerate 
democratic liberty, impartial justice, and the respect of the individual, which are the 
foundations of our Western civilization.” 226F227 NATO did not seek to impose its democratic 
values on the USSR. The concern was the combination of the aforementioned Soviet values 
with the USSR’s militant and expansionist tendencies. NATO states that since the end of 
the Second World War the USSR has used internal subversion and armed intervention to 
annex or control through proxies the nations of Central and Eastern Europe thus enslaving 
over 100 million people. 227F228 NATO’s view at the time was that the USSR is not content to 
stop, but is instead intent on dominating the world. 228F229 The USSR is seen as seeking to 
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neutralize NATO by separating its members through intimidation, propaganda, and playing 
on national differences. 229F230 Even in the later 1980s, towards the end of the Cold War, the 
aggression of the Soviet Union over the previous four decades was a concern and was 
pointed out in NATO publications. 230F231 
5. Goals of NATO Propaganda  
The goals of NATO information campaigns can be discerned in many of the 
propaganda pieces created and distributed by NATIS. Due to the existential threat of the 
Soviet Union, a number of the goals of NATO propaganda related to the military function 
of the Alliance including reminding the populace of the Soviet danger, reassuring NATO 
allies, and countering Soviet anti-NATO propaganda. 231F232 NATO information campaigns 
had additional important goals. The Alliance sought to bolster support for NATO from the 
populace, educate said populace on NATO’s purpose, and highlight the value of the 
Alliance.232F233 Risso writes that shortly after the formation of NATIS, a working group 
determined that NATO information campaigns must support two main goals: promote the 
reason for NATO’s core existence as a defensive alliance and advertise NATO’s role in 
increasing the prosperity of its members through economic and political cooperation. The 
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former goal related to the provisions of Article Five of The North Atlantic Treaty and the 
latter goal to Article Two. 233F234 In addition, the publication of the 1967 Harmel Report, 
known formally as the “Report of the Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance,” 
provided additional impetus to focus on goals related to showcasing NATO’s non-military 
benefits and as well as NATO’s pursuit of peace. The Harmel Report reaffirmed NATO’s 
core reasons for existence while acknowledging that the global situation had changed since 
1949. It called upon the Alliance to play a key role “in the promotion of détente and the 
strengthening of peace.”234F235 
6. The Common Themes of NATO Propaganda 
There are four main themes that appear in NATO propaganda throughout the Cold 
War. All of the themes fall into two groupings: those relating to NATO’s military purpose 
and the themes relating to NATO’s political and economic benefits. Two of the main 
themes fall into the former category and promote collective self-defense as well as the need 
to deter the existential threat posed by the Soviet Union. The other two main themes fall 
into the latter categorization and seek to portray NATO as being more than a military 
alliance as well championing the values NATO embodies and upholds. As Risso argues, 
NATO recognized that it needed to adjust messaging themes throughout the Cold War. The 
focus could not always be on themes related to Article Five but had to expand and 
incorporate themes highlighting Article Two. This was especially important to counter the 
Soviet Union’s peace offensive propaganda campaign. 235F236  
7. NATO Cold War Visual Propaganda Analysis 
The selection of visual pieces in this section provide an overview of NATO public 
information efforts during the Cold War. The pieces consist of a couple posters, a 
photograph, a short film, a short book, and two brochures. They are representative of the 
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mediums that NATO relied on to spread its messaging to the civilians and members of the 
armed forces in NATO countries. 
This poster, Figure 16, created by Giuseppe Groce, was an Italian entry in a poster 
contest held by the Marshall Plan, formally known as the European Recovery Program 
(ERP) in 1950. The themes of the winning posters focus on the economic recovery of 
Europe through the cooperation of its constituent nations. The 25 winning posters including 
this one were utilized by NATO in its European traveling exhibitions throughout the 1950s 
to build support for European cooperation.236F237 
In the poster a towering female figure dominates the view. Perhaps she represents 
Europa, a nymph in ancient Greek mythology long associated with the founding of Europe. 
The figure has firm brick-like foundations in the European soil and stretches heavenward 
into the deep blue sky. This figure is an interesting contrast to the massive Soviet warrior 
in Figure 4. Here the figure looks towards a peace dove and yet her strength is still present 
as represented by her war spear. Draped across her head and shoulders is a scarf made up 
of the flags of 13 European nations. In the foreground, shoots of grain have recently 
sprouted while in the background a factory’s smokestacks spout smoke. These symbols 
show that after the destruction of the Second World War, the earth is again producing food 
and the rebuilt factories are creating goods. Further it symbolizes that this is all possible 
when the nations of Europe unite together. 
                                                 




Figure 16. Europe Looks to Peace but is Ready for War.237F238 
This second poster, Figure 17, was created to commemorate the tenth anniversary 
of the founding of the NATO alliance. According to the NATO web page, it was used for 
many years throughout Alliance countries to bolster support for NATO. 238F239 The illustrator 
is unknown though a signature can be found oriented vertically on the left side of the poster. 
The poster is striking due to the figures depicted and the use of starkly contrasting 
colors. The figures of the woman and child call to mind depictions of the Madonna and 
Child, familiar imagery in Europe due to prevalent depiction of Mary and the baby Jesus 
in Christian art dating back centuries. The image of mother and child without the presence 
of a husband or father figure would also have been a familiar sight to those who had lived 
through the death and destruction of the Second World War. In the poster the child stares 
at the viewer while the presumed mother looks toward the wall that protects her and her 
child. The wall is formed by the NATO Alliance members. On her side the wall appears 
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solid with no gaps, yet in profile one can see that it is made up of building blocks, in this 
case the 15 members of the Alliance in 1959. The flags depicted are of the original 12 
members plus Greece and Turkey (joined in 1952) and the FRG (joined in 1955). 239F240 The 
images and words remind the viewer that the NATO Alliance has protected the women and 
children of its constituent states for the last decade. 
 
Figure 17. Ten Years of NATO’s Protection. 240F241 
This photograph, Figure 18, captures a historic moment in NATO and European 
history. The photograph was taken at the NAC Ministerial Session in Paris, France on 
October 23, 1954. The day before on October 22, 1954, the NAC along with other business 
approved a protocol inviting the FRG to join NATO and this photograph captures the 
signing of this protocol the next day. 241F242 It was one of a number of international accords 
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that were signed over a few days in October 1954 and are collectively known as the Paris 
Agreements. One of the more famous accords amended the Brussels Treaty and invited the 
FRG and Italy to join the Western Union, resulting in the creation of the Western European 
Union. 242F243 
The setting of the photograph is important. The arch of the ministers’ tables directs the 
viewer’s gaze to the signatory chair and past it to the arching structure of the Eiffel Tower, 
recognized worldwide as a symbol of Paris. Ten years prior to this photograph the whole 
European continent was engulfed by war and Paris had been liberated from Nazi German 
occupation on August 25, 1944. Yet here are gathered many of Germany’s former foes to invite 
it to join a new defensive Alliance. This is a momentous occasion and it conveys what the 
nations of Europe along with Canada and the U.S. can accomplish together. 
 
Figure 18. A Historic Moment as the FRG is Invited to Join the Alliance. 243F244  
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The image, Figure 19, is adapted from the cover of a short book created by the 
NATO Information Service in 1959. The book NATO: Hope of the Free World is 23 pages 
and is interspersed with illustrations similar in style to the cover aimed at adolescents. It is 
composed of an introduction explaining that NATO was formed while “Western 
democracy was in full retreat before the constant aggression of Soviet Russia.” 244F245 It further 
explains what NATO has accomplished in the 10 years since its founding: that NATO has 
preserved peace, halted Soviet expansion, raised living standards. The text acknowledges 
that NATO, like democracies, needs the continued support of every individual and that this 
is only possible through education and understanding. 245F246 Then through 15 questions and 
answers it explains NATO, its goals, important policy positions, relationship to the United 
Nations (UN), and closes explaining the citizen’s role in NATO. The book remarks on the 
Soviet attempts to disrupt NATO and notes that a preferred tactic is to threaten and pressure 
individual NATO members, but that the Alliance is able to respond in a united manner and 
thus stymie the USSR. This is followed with an observation that the USSR is likely to test 
out other tactics to fracture the Alliance because NATO “remains the great bulwark against 
their drive to rule the world.” 246F247  
The illustrations throughout the text soundly reinforce the messaging of the book. 
The imagery is simple, but it powerfully conveys ideas to the reader. It begins with the 
cover and first two pages where the NATO star deflects a red arrow from striking the well-
known landmarks of NATO states. Additional illustrations include a rabid-looking bear 
leaning menacingly over a map of Europe appearing ready to carve it with a hammer and 
sickle. The danger of the USSR is reinforced on the next pages with an outline of the 
Kremlin in red with wispy, devilish tendrils reaching out from it across the pages towards 
drawings of major European landmarks. The following pages counterpoint this by a 
drawing of Uncle Sam astride a donkey and elephant whose tails are entwined, both 
appearing happy (an interesting image given today’s political partisanship in the U.S.), 
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while Uncle Sam’s arm stretches diagonally across the entire book to clasp hands with 
figures depicting the UK and France. Later drawings depict: a bucolic outdoor market with 
stalls comprised of the NATO members, the star of the NATO Alliance mediating and 
comforting two men who are portrayed as arguing, a policeman with a NATO badge 
confronting a shocked robber (in the guise of a bear) carrying a bag with the words 
“CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, LATVIA” written on it. The book closes with a 
depiction of a city at night with a woman holding her child inside her home and high 
overhead appears the only star, the NATO star. This serves as closing reminder that even 
though one might not realize it, NATO is always watching over and protecting its citizens’ 
way of life.  
 
Figure 19. A Short Book for Adolescents Explaining NATO’s Purpose. 247F248 
In late 1984 and early 1985, NATIS prepared and produced a 10-page brochure 
entitled “Women in the NATO Forces.” Figure 20 is a photograph included in the brochure. 
It was created in preparation for the 12th Conference of the Committee of Women in the 
NATO Forces that took place in May 1985. The brochure’s text provides a brief history of 
the Committee, its purpose and responsibility, along with policies and statistics pertaining 
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to women in the armed services of NATO members. The brochure notes that Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Norway, the UK, and U.S. organized the first conference in 1961 with the 
purpose of encouraging the “wider employment of women within the services to the 
common benefit of NATO.” 248F249 It is pointed out that the committee’s position since 1973 
is that women should be used in all military roles except for combat ones. Yet, looking to 
the future and recognizing the valuable contribution of women to NATO forces, the 
brochure’s text envisions an ever-increasing role for women and that the combat 
prohibition will continue to be debated.249F250 
The text is accompanied by 13 photographs showcasing women in different military 
roles. They range from a medical role, what might be considered more traditional, to 
physical (refueling an aircraft) and technical (repairing telecommunications equipment and 
piloting an aircraft), and even of a female soldier aiming a M-72 Light Anti-Tank Weapon, 
a disposable rocket launcher. Perhaps this latter photograph hints at the debate over 
allowing women into combat roles. Figure 20 is of three women in pilot attire standing in 
front of a what appears to be a Fouga CM.170 Magister two-seat jet trainer aircraft. It 
demonstrates to girls and young women that in NATO countries they are capable of 
operating technologically advanced weapons of war. The purpose of the brochure is not 
only to educate the citizens of NATO countries, but also to demonstrate NATO’s 
commitment to democratic values including equality. In addition, the brochure continues 
the theme found in the book associated with Figure 19, that NATO needs all the citizens to 
support the Alliance. Here it shows that women can have a vital and martial role in 
bolstering the Alliance and NATO cannot forgo such support in its defense of Europe. 
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Figure 20. Three Pilots Representing Women Serving in NATO. 250F251 
NATO distributed the next brochure between 1986 and 1989 to educate the 
populations of member states on the Alliance. The image, Figure 21, appears on the cover 
and depicts Europe and highlights the location of NATO HQ in Belgium. Similar to the 
other NATO publications discussed earlier, this work is a combination of short paragraphs 
of text and illustrations. The brochure explains NATO’s origins, basis in Article 51 of the 
UN Charter, NATO’s goals, its structure, and why it still exists. It is an interesting contrast 
to the book associated with Figure 19. The intended audience is clearly older as inferred 
both from the style of illustration and from the more detailed textual description of NATO. 
Of particular note is that while Soviet aggression is evidenced as both an impetus for 
NATO’s creation and continued necessity, the level of fear is significantly toned down. 
The text describes NATO as being established “after a period of growing Soviet post-war 
expansionism.” 251F252 The Soviet menace still exists as does possible nuclear annihilation, but 
it is not 1959 and the USSR is no longer a rabid bear poised to devour Europe. 
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Figure 21. Welcome to NATO HQ. 252F253 
The last piece analyzed in this section is a short film, “High Journey.” The image 
of the Acropolis of Ancient Athens, Figure 22, was captured from the film. It is 
representative of the film which was shot in color entirely from the air utilizing air force 
aircraft of the NATO members. The film gives the viewer the sensation of flying across 
Europe as clips of ten Alliance nations are shown. One is treated to striking shots of 
mountains, seas, and other landscape features of Europe from the far northern lands to the 
southern reaches and from Portugal in the west to Turkey in the east. Famous cities of 
Europe including Lisbon, the ports of the Low Countries, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Athens, and 
Istanbul all appear.  
The film was produced by NATIS under the direction of Peter Baylis. The original 
version was released in March 1959 in French followed quickly by English, Portuguese, 
and German versions. Additional languages were added in the 1960s and early 1970s. A 
revised version of the film was released in 1969 to include footage of the Berlin Wall. Of 
interest is that the English language version of the film is narrated by Orson Welles. 253F254 
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This film propaganda was targeted at NATO population demographics broadly. According 
to NATO, the film received wide theatrical distribution and won awards including a silver 
medal at the Venice Film Festival in 1959 and Best Short Film from the British Film 
Academy Award in 1960. 254F255  
The focus of the film is not NATO or military themes. Instead the viewer is drawn 
in by the splendor of Europe. This is reinforced in the English language version by the 
narration of Welles. He provides an evocative and engaging narrative weaving together 
commentary on the physical geography of Europe along with its ancient and modern 
history as well as its culture. The interconnectedness of Europe is stressed. At one point as 
the viewer flies across the industry of the Ruhr, Saar, and Lorraine, Welles remarks that 
these are no longer national regions, but one industrial community. As footage of Athens, 
including Figure 22, is seen, Welles speaks an excerpt from Pericles’ Funeral Oration. This 
quote encapsulates one of NATO’s values: that power should not be in the hands of a 
minority like in the USSR, but in the hands of the democratically elected representatives 
of the people. Towards the end of the film, as the viewer flies over Istanbul,  Welles 
reinforces this unity of Europe saying, “An old world of many nations and many flags, with 
different languages and different ways of life, but in spite of it all, drawn together by 
something they have in common, something they think worth having, something they think 
worth keeping.” 255F256 Only at a few points throughout the film do Alliance military aircraft 
appear and they are shown patrolling the skies over Europe. The defensive might of the 
Alliance is not fully shown until the end when fighter aircraft are scrambled to intercept an 
unidentified aircraft. It turns out, creatively, that this is the viewer’s aircraft, as one 
intercepting fighter jet aims right at the viewer. The NATO flight leader is then assured by 
Welles that the unidentified aircraft (the viewer) is a friend to which the flight leader 
responds, “Pass friend, on your way!” and banks away from the viewer.256F257  
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Figure 22. The Acropolis and Parthenon, Symbols of Athenian 
Democracy. 257F258 
B. NATO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS SINCE 2014 
1. NATO Views on Propaganda 
In the 1990s and the early 2000s the Alliance struggled with relevancy following 
the disappearance of the Soviet threat as well as new challenges including the admission 
of new members, international terrorism, and the International Security Assistance Force 
mission in Afghanistan. Thus, in the turmoil of this post-Cold War world it became 
apparent that there was a need for an invigorated public information campaign. Barbora 
Maronkova, director of the NATO Information and Documentation Center, argues that 
NATO encountered numerous challenges in this new century that necessitated effective 
communication with the populations of Alliance members in order to bolster support for 
NATO. 258F259  
In January 2004 at his first press briefing as NATO Secretary General, Jaap de 
Hoop Scheffer singled out the criticality of messaging to NATO in this period by saying 
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“Public diplomacy will be key to our reputation both inside and outside the Alliance.” 259F260 
The Alliance recognizes that in the 21PstP century it needs to connect with individuals and 
inform them of what NATO is, its role, and its value. As recently as 2017 NATO 
acknowledged that “in some Allied countries, over half of 18–24-year-olds haven’t even 
heard of NATO. Across all Allies, people with lower education levels are generally less 
likely to see NATO as relevant in maintaining peace and security, and almost a quarter of 
people believe NATO actually makes the world more dangerous.” 260F261 This is a serious 
problem given that NATO relies on the support of its members, democratic states, and that 
one of Russia’s propaganda themes is that NATO is aggressive and militaristic. It is also 
not different from during the Cold War when, as discussed in the Section A of this chapter, 
NATO information campaigns strove to mobilize support from the populace. Another need 
for a robust and continuous information campaign is NATO’s realization that “if we don’t 
tell our own story, others will tell it for us…and to make sure they [the billion people living 
within NATO] support and value us, we have to explain every day why NATO matters.” 261F262 
The ceding of the NATO narrative to a third party is too risky: The best case is messaging 
that is favorable, but NATO has no control over the content or the coordination thus 
impacting its effectiveness. The worst case is a scenario where Russia or another power 
spreads propaganda harmful to the Alliance unchecked. 
The view persists at NATO, like in the Cold War, that the Alliance does not 
generate propaganda. Robert Pszcel, former director of the NATO Information Office in 
Moscow, writes that “we [NATO] do not resort to propaganda, we stick to facts and open 
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debate.”262F263 NATO Spokesperson Oana Lungescu states that it is critical that the Alliance, 
an organization funded by taxpayers, must be open and truthful in its communications with 
the public. 263F264 Propaganda, even of the white type, is seen as deceitful and not a tool of 
democracies. Thus, NATO refers to its efforts as public diplomacy.  
The term public diplomacy originated from Ambassador Edmund Guillion, a U.S. 
diplomat, around 1965. At the time, he was dean at the Fletcher School of Law & 
Diplomacy at Tufts University. He sought to describe the process by which a government 
and its private citizens interact with and influence the citizens of other countries. 
Originally, he would have used the term propaganda as “it seemed like the nearest thing in 
the pure interpretation of the word to what we were doing. But ‘propaganda’ has always a 
pejorative connotation in this country. To describe the whole range of communications, 
information and propaganda, we hit upon ‘public diplomacy’.” 264F265  
Cull as well as scholar John Brown provide similar arguments as it pertains to 
public diplomacy. They argue that though public diplomacy and propaganda overlap with 
many similarities, key differences can be discerned. The former is truthful, objective, and 
usually involves two-way dialogue whereas propaganda selects facts, is biased, and is one-
way. In addition, public diplomacy strives to learn from its audience to improve dialogue 
while propaganda desires feedback only to better target.265F266 Jowett and O’Donnell argue 
that the debate is still not settled as to whether public diplomacy is propaganda. They write 
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that there are strong similarities and shared characteristics. Yet, they find that dialogue and 
exchange of ideas found in some forms of public diplomacy prevent all public diplomacy 
from being labeled propaganda. 266F267  
A key for NATO is to increase the public’s knowledge of NATO while promoting 
dialogue and understanding. The Alliance aims to disseminate information and learn from 
responses of the audience. 267F268 Like in the Cold War, NATO realizes that the information 
campaigns need to be able to be tailored to specific Alliance countries or be disseminated 
on a pan-Alliance basis. 268F269 
2. NATO Methods of Propaganda 
NATO’s information efforts since 2014 are a mixture of strict public diplomacy 
and white propaganda that rely on NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) and support 
from the national efforts of member states. This determination of the difference of the two 
is based on a review of the arguments regarding public diplomacy and propaganda posited 
by the four scholars referenced in the previous subsection. Alliance messaging is white 
propaganda when it lacks the two-way exchange of ideas and meaningful dialogue.  
The PDD is responsible for “engaging multiple audiences on the Alliance’s policies 
and activities worldwide.” 269F270 It is the modern successor to NATIS. The PDD was created 
in 2003 from the merger of the Scientific and Environmental Affairs Division with the 
Office of Information and Press (OIP), itself formed in 1990 to assume the information 
outreach of NATO’s Cold War efforts. Maronkova notes that NATO was the first 
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international organization to create a division dedicated to public diplomacy. 270F271 Another 
vestige of the Cold War was replaced in 2004 when the Committee on Public Diplomacy 
(CPD) succeeded the CICR. The CPD continues as an advisory body to the NAC on issues 
concerning communications, media, and public engagement. It is also responsible for 
NATO’s public diplomacy strategy. 271F272 
Last decade, NATO leadership realized they had a branding problem and that 
NATO was way behind in digital communications. In October 2007, then NATO Secretary 
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer gave a speech on public diplomacy in which he referred to 
NATO as being in the “stone age” when it came to the Alliance’s ability to communicate 
to the public in the new information environment. 272F273 In 2015, Steven Mehringer, then 
Head of Communications Services at NATO, recounted that this speech was a seminal 
moment for NATO leadership. They recognized there was a serious problem and took steps 
to rectify it. 273F274 A July 2008 article in The New York Times recounts how NATO hired a 
Coca-Cola executive to help revitalize the NATO brand in order to bolster support for the 
Alliance. 274F275 In September 2014 the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of 
Excellence opened in Riga, Latvia with the mission to assist NATO allies and partners in 
improving strategic communications through research, seminars, and doctrine and policy 
development. 275F276 In June 2017 NATO launched the #WeAreNATO campaign to highlight 
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the contributions of all member states to maintaining the Alliance and the benefits 
emanating from Euro-Atlantic security. 276F277 The NATO brand matters because it is how 
everyone outside the organization perceives NATO and helps them understand why NATO 
exists and why it is so valuable.  
3. NATO Means of Propaganda 
NATO utilizes multiple means to communicate with the public. These means of 
communication include utilization of publications, film, cooperation with private 
associations/non-governmental organizations, visits to NATO headquarters, and 
conferences. These were used by NATO during the Cold War and have been updated for 
the 21PstP century. The biggest difference from the Cold War lies in the usage of digital 
communications.  
Publications include NATO Review, a free online magazine, that is the successor to 
the NATO Letter, a publication created shortly after the founding of NATIS. 277F278 NATO 
Review examines NATO’s role in the world today and discusses challenges such as 
disinformation, cyber security, climate change, etc. 278F279 The Alliance also publishes online 
various reference material. Like in the Cold War these publications are targeted at different 
demographics. For example, NATO has posters and brochures aimed at adolescents to 
introduce them to the Alliance, whereas for journalists, academics, researchers, etc., items 
such as a NATO Encyclopedia, guides to NATO summits, and annual reports on the 
Alliance are produced by NATO. To support NATO’s theme of transparency, many of 
NATO’s publications from previous decades are available through an online archive. 
Films continue to be a strong visual means of NATO conveying its messages to the 
public. Thanks to advances in technology, NATO does not have to rely on mobile 
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exhibitions, gatherings, or theaters to show its films. The internet and associated 
technology enable NATO to share short films globally and maintain the catalogue online 
for users to browse and view at their leisure. Some of these shorts include a series 
supporting the Alliance’s #WeAreNATO campaign. These film shorts showcase individual 
service members of NATO countries, the NATO member states themselves, and messages 
from NATO leadership. 279F280 Another film series called NATO Experts has Alliance leaders 
answering critical questions such as how NATO makes the world safer. 280F281 
NATO’s relationships with private associations, NGOs, and think tanks throughout 
the Alliance provide NATO the ability to reach educators, researchers, and policy 
influencers. These bonds are strengthened through visits to NATO HQ as well as 
conferences. Maronkova describes this as assisting NATO experts and creating new ones 
and then fostering a network of them via the Alliances visitor programs and conferences. 
Thus, NATO has a sound group of individuals throughout the Alliance who can publicly 
and authoritatively support NATO in challenging times. 281F282 
The Alliance uses digital communications as a way to reach large audiences while 
gaining flexibility in messaging and rapidity in disseminating content. Mehringer in a 2015 
interview described how poorly NATO was communicating online and the actions since 
2007 to fix this problem. 282F283 Today, NATO has an official presence on digital platforms 
such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube. These platforms enable the outreach 
and dialogue components of public diplomacy that NATO embraces. The official accounts 
of NATO officials such as Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Spokesperson Oana 
Lungescu boost NATO’s reach and amplify the intended message. All of these means help 
to reinforce NATO’s brand and themes the Alliances wants the populace to absorb. 
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4. NATO Views of Russia 
Since Russia’s aggression in Georgia (2008) and especially following the Russian 
annexation of Crimea (2014) along with the continuing war in eastern Ukraine, NATO’s 
view of Russia has become more critical, and the relationship has deteriorated. This is a 
change from the optimistic years of the 1990s and early 2000s, a time for repairing relations 
with Russia and former Warsaw Pact states. Admitting additional countries to NATO after 
the end of the Cold War was and is viewed as a positive and key to eliminating divisions 
between Western and Central and Eastern European nations. Alliance members recognized 
that Russia could be uneasy with this. 283F284 There were attempts by NATO in the 1990s and 
early 2000s to involve Russia with the Alliance through the Partnership for Peace (1994), 
the NATO–Russia Founding Act (1997), and the NATO–Russia Council (2002). In 
addition, NATO in 1996 announced that it would not deploy nuclear weapons to the 
territory of new members. 284F285 Yet, as discussed in Chapter II, this was not enough to 
alleviate Russian fear of the West. 
Now the Alliance sees Russia as a state uninterested in meaningful dialogue with 
the West while the Kremlin seeks to undermine the Alliance and dominate countries found 
to reside within Russia’s perceived sphere of influence. In April 2014, NATO’s Deputy 
Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow gave a speech in which he stated that 
Russia had turned to “crude propaganda reminiscent of Stalin’s times, rather than engaging 
in an honest debate and search for common ground.” 285F286 In the same speech Vershbow said 
Putin fears stable democracies that could provide an unflattering contrast to his 
authoritarian system. Thus, Putin seeks to stymie them through the creation of a Russian 
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sphere of influence in Eurasia. When this is not enough, Russia resorts to destabilizing 
uncooperative states through material support to separatist groups and enabling frozen 
conflicts. 286F287 NATO provides a bulwark to Russian aggression against smaller Alliance 
members through NATO’s collective security. This makes NATO a target and the Alliance 
realizes that Russia seeks to destabilize and divide NATO. Dr. Kęstutis Paulauskas writes 
that “Cold War opponents [NATO and the USSR] were status-quo powers, invested in 
maintaining strategic stability. Today’s potential adversaries are deliberately seeking to 
undermine and ultimately destroy the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.”287F288 The Alliance 
recognizes that today’s Russia is a fundamental threat to the integrity of NATO. 
5. NATO Goals of Propaganda 
The goals of NATO’s public diplomacy efforts since 2014 are similar to the 
Alliance goals discussed in Section A of this chapter with one main difference. The similar 
goals are to increase the public’s knowledge about NATO and bolster and broaden support 
for the Alliance. The major goal that is different is that the Alliance strives to confront and 
counter Russian anti-NATO propaganda.  
NATO seeks to inform the public about the Alliance, its programs, initiatives, and 
military exercises. For example, in early 2019 Allied Joint Force Command Naples - 
NATO hosted a visit by researchers and journalists from Serbia. The visit allowed for 
dialogue regarding the role of NATO in the Balkans. In addition, it provided information 
on and insight into NATO that these researchers and journalists can share with a larger 
audience back in Serbia. 288F289 NATO must also convey through its information efforts the 
Alliance’s value and core values in order to maintain public support and increase it. Events 
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like the Alliance sponsored all-day town hall, NATO Engages, held the day before the 
December 2019 NATO Leaders Summit in London, work to convey “NATO’s enduring 
value in meeting these challenges [hybrid conflict, disinformation, cyber security, and great 
power competition].” 289F290 In addition, national information efforts can assist NATO to 
achieve its public diplomacy goals, like Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic’s recent 
statement: “membership of NATO and its Article 5 give us that key umbrella of collective 
security which in future, and today as well, will prevent any aggression against Croatia 
such as the one we had in the early 90s.” 290F291  
Since 2014 and the increase in anti-NATO propaganda disseminated by Russia, 
NATO has sought to engage and counter Russia’s propaganda assault with the Alliance’s 
public diplomacy. Maronkova writes that “NATO is determined to counter propaganda not 
with propaganda, but with facts.”291F292NATO has a webpage that is regularly updated that 
lists anti-NATO claims of Russian officials and then refutes these falsehoods. 292F293 
Maronkova points out that NATO personnel are very active on social media and regularly 
use it to highlight Russian propaganda and then provide facts to disarm it. 293F294  
6. NATO Themes of Propaganda 
The main themes in NATO public diplomacy efforts are the values NATO 
embodies, the benefits of NATO, and the relevancy of the Alliance today. These themes 
are similar to those found in NATO propaganda of the Cold War minus the existential 
threat of the Soviet Union. Values that are portrayed include peace, democracy, freedom, 
cooperation, and unity (especially in the form of the transatlantic bond). There is also a 
                                                 
290 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, “About NATO Engages,” NATO Engages: Innovating the 
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focus on themes of dialogue and transparency that provide further counterpoints to Russian 
propaganda accusing NATO of aggressiveness and warmongering.  
The resurgence of Russia and the concern of NATO members especially along the 
Alliance’s border with Russia can explain the themes of collective defense and deterrence 
appearing in Alliance information efforts. Coupled with these themes is the reinforcement 
of the need to devote sufficient funds to provide for this security. Other benefits such as 
the stability and prosperity that NATO engenders are also featured.  
Lastly, messaging includes not only the need for the Alliance today, but also that 
NATO is flexible and agile enough to adapt to changing and emerging challenges of the 
21PstP century such as cyber security. 
7. NATO Visual Propaganda Analysis 
This section contains a selection for visual pieces to provide the reader with an 
overview of NATO public diplomacy efforts since 2014. The selection consists of eight 
pieces: a couple of photographs, four short films, and two Tweets. Though NATO utilizes 
additional mediums of communications to convey its messages and themes these best 
represent what NATO relies on to reach the public. 
This first photograph, Figure 23, is posted to NATO’s official Instagram account 
and shows the complement of Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group Two 
(SNMCMG2). The four Standing Maritime Groups are integrated naval forces comprised 
of NATO members that give the Alliance an “immediate operational response capability 
both in peacetime and in crisis.” 294F295 The photograph shows the warships of SNMCMG2 
rafted together with the ships’ companies in formation on deck. The photo conveys the 
themes of unity and cooperation while valuing individuality. The nations of the Alliance 
have brought their separate capabilities (equipment and personnel) together to operate as 
an integrated force. The nations maintain their pride as seen by each state’s national flag, 
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but the viewer is reminded that they have come together to enjoy the benefits of collective 
defense. 
 
Figure 23. Crews from Four Alliance Navies Patrol Together. 295F296 
The second photo, Figure 24, posted to NATO’s official Flickr account is of the 
Oxford Philharmonic Orchestra performing in the Agora of the new NATO Headquarters 
on November 6, 2019. The depiction of the photo is very different from many of NATO’s 
recent photographs that tend to feature either martial subjects or the political side of the 
Alliance. This photograph highlights NATO’s values of unity, cooperation, and cultural 
appreciation. The picture (and the concert) shows that NATO is more than a military 
alliance. In the foreground is the orchestra, and the audience comprised of military 
personnel and civilians stretches into the distance of the frame. The creator of the event, 
Director Bogdan Lazaroae of the NATO Headquarters Project Office and Transition 
Office, summed up the importance of NATO holding this concert when he said: 
Art, in all its forms, is a universal language that transcends cultures, spoken 
languages, disagreements and difference. Art is something we can all 
coalesce around and have a common experience that will help us all set 
                                                 
296 Source: NATO, Crews from the UK, Italy, Spain, and Turkey and Staff of Standing NATO Mine 
Countermeasures Group Two (SNMCMG2) Stand with the Scientists from Centre for Maritime Research 
and Experimentation, June 1, 2018, Photograph, https://www.instagram.com/p/BjeglLxDLty/.  
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aside our differences and live what is in front of us. This concert brought us 
all together in a magnificent space and reminded us of our purpose in this 
building and the staying power of the Alliance over the last 70 years. 296F297  
 The imagery reinforces in the viewer’s mind the linkage between civilians and the 
armed forces and civilian control of them in a democracy, another value of NATO. In 
addition, the photograph associates NATO with European culture and demonstrates that 
NATO values such culture and has helped defend it and the Euro-Atlantic way of life for 
70 years. 
 
Figure 24. NATO Celebrates 70PthP Anniversary of the Alliance with Music. 297F298 
The image, Figure 25, is adapted from a short film entitled NATO’s 70th 
Anniversary Year – A Look Back. The film is featured on NATO’s official Facebook page 
and hosted on its YouTube channel. This demonstrates NATO’s usage of two different 
digital platforms to uniquely display content and drive traffic through crosspollination. 
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Figure 25 strongly conveys the theme of unity. Here on this stage are the political leaders 
of the Alliance. They may disagree on many points as may their countries, but here they 
stand united by the Alliance because they recognize the benefits militarily, politically, and 
economically.  
The film itself is a compilation of multiple clips backed by rousing orchestral 
music. The film reflects on NATO’s celebration of its past 70 years as well as other 
significant events and moments of 2019. It opens with a clip of NATO Secretary General 
Stoltenberg remarking on how much progress NATO has made together over the last 20 
years. The footage throughout the film is overlaid with text banners such as the one seen 
in Figure 25. They flow together and combined with the footage convey NATO’s values 
and benefits. The emphasis throughout is on cooperation, teamwork, and purpose that 
generate strength and innovation. The film reminds viewers that NATO is not only about 
the Euro-Atlantic framework, but that NATO seeks to work with partners around the world. 
One of the central tenets of the Alliance, collective security, is focused on with the words 
“We came together and renewed our solemn commitment to each other that an attack 
against one Ally is an attack against us all.” 298F299 At the closing of the film, the viewer is 
given a final reminder as to the value of NATO: the final footage is of NATO Secretary 
General Stoltenberg speaking before a joint meeting of the United States Congress on April 
3, 2019, where he says “Madam Speaker, Mr. Vice President, it is good to have friends.”299F300 
This is a simple yet powerful analogy that everyone can relate to. 
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Figure 25. Leaders of Europe and North America United by NATO. 300 F301  
The image, Figure 26 is adapted from the short film Defending the East of the 
Alliance – NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence. It is posted to NATO’s official YouTube 
channel. The objective of the film is to explain what NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence 
(eFP) is and why it is necessary. Themes of solidarity, purpose, and NATO’s relevancy 
appear throughout the film. Footage of Alliance military vehicles and troops being 
deployed via ships, trains, and aircraft are mixed with live fire exercises and troops on 
maneuvers. Context is provided by a narrator, President Dalia Grybauskaitė of Lithuania, 
President Kersti Kaljulaid of Estonia, and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg. The 
presidents explain that eFP is needed because Russia does not respect international 
agreements, seeks to upend the international value-based world order, and wants to reassert 
influence over the Baltic States like the USSR had. The film is well produced with the film 
imagery complementing the dialogue spoken over it. The soundtrack fits the mood of the 
narrative. It is somber and serious when discussing the Soviet occupation of the Baltic 
States and the current behavior of Russia. The music amps up during scenes of NATO 
military forces in action and is uplifting when the narrative discusses the details of eFP. 
Secretary General Stoltenberg closes the film by stating that NATO does not desire a new 
Cold War and instead NATO seeks dialogue with Russia, but NATO must convey a clear 
message of strength so Russia does not miscalculate the Alliance’s resolve. He concludes 
                                                 
301 Adapted from NATO, "NATO’s 70th Anniversary Year – A Look Back." 
 
 108 
by saying “NATO stands as one for all, all for one. That’s the best way to conflict.”301F302 
This counters the Russian propaganda theme that NATO is aggressive and desires war. 
Figure 26 is representative of the many scenes of military personnel and weapons 
of war in action. In this image is displayed a tangible commitment of NATO combat power. 
The unit appears to be British Army as one can identify in the foreground a FV107 
Scimitar, a British Army armored reconnaissance vehicle, a Land Rover Defender, and a 
number of all-terrain vehicles. In the middle ground rests a column of five Warrior armored 
vehicles used by the British Army. At least two variants are present, while in the 
background and in the distance are numerous military vehicles of various types. There is 
also a flag that might be battalion or regimental colors, but they are not identifiable. The 
British Army deployed approximately 800 troops to Estonia and led the eFP in 2017. 302F303 
 
Figure 26. Biggest Reinforcement of Collective Defense in a Generation. 303F304 
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The image, Figure 27, is adapted from the short film The Spanish “Lady Hawk.” It 
is posted to NATO’s official YouTube channel and prompted on NATO’s website. This 
short is one of a series of films created for the #WeAreNATO campaign. The films are a 
mix of shorts focusing on a NATO member country or on an individual from one of these 
such as a Romanian fighter pilot, a U.S. paratrooper, or an Italian oceanographer. The film 
series seeks to educate viewers and encourage a positive outlook on NATO. The country 
shorts do this through a focus on the contributions of the particular Alliance country 
discussed as well as the benefits of NATO to that state. The films focused on an individual 
utilize interesting, passionate, and likeable subjects to promote a sense of the positive, 
hardworking, and principled people contributing to NATO. Some of these films take an 
even more humanistic approach. The Italian oceanographer, a civilian working for NATO, 
describes painting in her free time as well as her love for the sea that she hopes to share 
with her future child. In another film a Polish solider serving in an armored unit describes 
his love of the army and for riding motorcycles.  
Figure 27 depicts Corporal Nuria Gallego Josere of the 7 PthP Light Infantry Brigade 
“Galicia” of the Spanish Army along with the brigade’s mascot, a female hawk named 
Patriot. The image portrays the falconer standing at attention with her hawk. Just visible 
along her back is slung her loaded service rifle, a Heckler & Koch G36, a reminder to the 
viewer along with her uniform that Corporal Josere is still a solider though she has a unique 
job. This also calls to mind the brochure associated with Figure 5 featuring women serving 
in NATO. Here is a female soldier, armed, and out in the field with her fellow soldiers. 
The short film is composed of clips of Corporal Josere, a falconer, training Patriot 
while she describes her duties as requiring great dedication and time but that her job is very 
rewarding. It is clear that there is a form of teamwork between falconer and hawk. The 
brigade’s mascot is fitting as the coat of arms of the brigade includes a diving falcon or 
hawk with outstretched talons. In addition, the motto of the brigade is “Honor from the 
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past; Pride from the Present”304F305 This short film conveys the message that the Spanish 
Army and by association NATO value history, teamwork, and culture. 
 
Figure 27. A Spanish Infantry Brigade’s Falconer and Unit Mascot. 305F306  
The image, Figure 28, is adapted from the short docudrama Forest Brothers - Fight 
for the Baltics. It is posted to NATO’s official YouTube channel. Forest Brothers tells the 
story of soldiers from the Baltic States and the civilians who aided them in resisting the 
Soviet occupation. Once it became apparent that the Soviet Union was not withdrawing 
after the Second World War, soldiers from the Baltic States took to the forests and rural 
areas and organized a resistance. They fought until 1953, though some held on into the 
1980s. The docudrama mixes clips of reenactors ambushing a Soviet Army patrol in the 
forest with interviews of former partisans and civilian supporters. The film connects to the 
present by showing footage of Lithuanian special forces with commentary from one of 
these special forces soldiers. He describes how the special forces of the Baltic States trace 
their lineage to the Forest Brothers. In addition, he shows a rocker tab patch on his uniform 
that reads ZALIUKAS and explains that it means someone who blends into the forest, a 
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Forest Brother. Figure 28 is representative of these clips. It shows this small special forces 
detachment appearing intimidating and capable as they patrol through the forest. 
NATO is not mentioned at all in the docudrama though the NATO logo appears in 
the bottom right and finally at the very end of the film. However, the purpose of the film 
is to inform the public and celebrate this history of resistance to the Soviet occupation of 
the Baltic States. The linkage to the modern special forces of these countries sends a 
reminder to the viewer that the elite soldiers of today have inherited this legacy and are 
ready to return to the forests if necessary. 
 
Figure 28. Baltic States’ Special Forces: Heirs to the Forest Brothers. 306F307 
The image, Figure 29, is of a post by NATO Press Secretary Oana Lungescu to the 
social media platform Twitter on June 28, 2017. The post shows how NATO directly 
confronts and counters Russian anti-NATO propaganda. This is enabled by modern 
communications technology and by NATO choosing to maintain a digital presence. In the 
post Lungescu replies to a post by the Russian Embassy in the UK stating that NATO 
troops do not belong in Eastern Europe. The Russian post includes a cartoon showing tanks 
with NATO flags on the EU–Russian border. A tank commander pronounces that the threat 
lies ahead while pointing to a shocked Russian man and his dog. Not only does Lungescu 
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refute the Russian propaganda by saying NATO forces were welcome by the Eastern 
European countries, but she points out the irony of the Russian claim given that Russia is 
occupying parts of three European countries. 
 
Figure 29. NATO Press Secretary Counters Russian Propaganda. 307F308 
The image, Figure 30, depicts another post by Lungescu to the official NATO Press 
Secretary account on Twitter on October 26, 2018. This post, like Figure 29, reinforces that 
NATO is willing and able to counter Russian propaganda. Lungescu’s post does not refute 
a specific piece of Russian propaganda but replies to wider Russian claims that military 
maneuvers and training associated with the NATO Trident Juncture 2018 exercise prove 
that the Alliance is aggressive and seeks conflict with Russia. Lungescu uses text and a 
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map graphic to soundly refute this propaganda. It is clear that the military exercise is not 
taking place anywhere near Russia. 
 
Figure 30. NATO Press Secretary Exposes Russian Propaganda.308F309 
C. CONCLUSION 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization recognizes the value and importance of 
propaganda and public diplomacy. NATO did so during the Cold War, but its extent and 
reach were limited by mandate, resources, and technology. In that period NATO developed 
and coordinated information campaigns focusing on the values and benefits of NATO and 
left most of the dissemination to the national information services of Alliance members. In 
addition, the rebuttal of Soviet anti-NATO and anti-Western propaganda was left up to 
those same national services. Today NATO is more sophisticated in using propaganda and 
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public diplomacy to disseminate NATO’s message and in confronting anti-NATO 
propaganda and countering Russian claims. The embrace of public diplomacy, new 
communications technologies, and a focus on NATO’s brand enables the Alliance to 
deliver much more assertive, sophisticated, coordinated, and rapid propaganda. 
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
These two brief case studies provide additional evidence of Russian anti-NATO 
propaganda as well as NATO efforts to counter it and bolster the Alliance. Each case study 
follows a similar format with a brief overview of the military exercise or policy followed 
by sections providing summaries of both Russian anti-NATO propaganda and NATO 
public diplomacy linked to the exercise or policy. The first case study looks at the Russian 
and Belarusian military exercise, Zapad 2017. The second concerns NATO’s Trident 
Juncture 2018 exercise. 
A. ZAPAD 2017 
1. Overview of Zapad 2017 Exercise 
Zapad 2017 was a joint exercise that was conducted by Russia and Belarus from 
September 14 to 20, 2017. According to the Russian government the exercise consisted of 
approximately 12,700 personnel, 680 vehicles, 70 planes and helicopters, and 10 warships. 
Zapad took place in areas of Belarus as well as in the Leningrad and Pskov regions and 
Kaliningrad enclave. The scenario had extremist groups, supplied by a foreign third party, 
infiltrate and attempt to destabilize Kaliningrad and parts of Belarus. The purpose of the 
exercise was to test the joint Russian and Belarussian forces’ command and control, 
mobility, and conflict escalation in responding to this externally supported insurgency. The 
Russian government maintained the exercise was defensive and did not target any foreign 
nations. 309F310 Researcher Lukas Andriukaitis provides additional information on the scenario 
and notes that the three fictional hostile countries created for the exercise include territory 
of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia. In addition, the main adversary country comprises large 
portions of Belarussian territory that in reality supported President Alexander 
                                                 




Lukashenko’s opponent in the 1994 elections, have a high concentration of Roman 
Catholics, and have other cultural and historical links with Poland and Lithuania. 310F311  
The exercise did spark international controversy over both its size and Russian 
intensions. In the months prior to Zapad NATO officials and government officials of 
NATO countries expressed concerns. These included questioning Russia’s official data on 
exercise participants believing Russia to be underestimating in order to avoid Organization 
for Security Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) Vienna Document requirements as well as 
whether Russia would leave troops deployed close to its borders with NATO countries. 311F312 
Scholar Roger McDermott in a post-Zapad review concludes that the official Russia claim 
to be “below the 13,000 threshold [of the OSCE Vienna Document] are certainly false.” 312F313 
Senior research scientist Michael Kofman provides a similar conclusion and estimates that 
approximately 45,000 personnel participated in Zapad. He also notes that Zapad, though 
officially only seven days, was actually a “training capstone amidst a high tempo of annual 
qualification checks, missile tests, and a host of other drills taking place in the Russian 
armed forces.”313F314 
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2. Russian Propaganda about Zapad 2017 
Russian anti-NATO propaganda connected with Zapad 2017 focused on portraying 
NATO as aggressive and overreacting to Russia, that the Zapad was defensive and Russia 
is peaceful, and that Russia is transparent (unlike NATO). These themes appeared 
separately as well as together in various forms of Russian propaganda including official 
statements, Russian media, and social media posts.  
Sputnik articles in August 2017 provide insight into the initial propaganda 
campaign as they relate NATO’s concern over Zapad 2017 as well as the invitation by 
Russia and Belarus to attend visitor events. 314F315 Here one can see the narrative being framed 
as NATO worried and Russia being transparent. As the exercise began the propaganda 
narrative begins to change. An RT article claimed to provide facts to combat hysteria 
regarding Zapad. The article recounts the official numbers of troops and equipment and 
then details estimates by NATO and non-NATO countries to show them as wildly 
exaggerated. The piece also promotes the theme that Zapad is defensive in nature and that 
Russia and Belarus have been completely transparent. The article closes by recounting 
NATO exercises including numbers of troops participating as a means to show that it is 
NATO that is being aggressive. 315F316 A second RT article is an example of the propaganda 
narrative expanding to attack another concern raised by some NATO members: that Russia 
might leave troops and equipment in Belarus. It seeks to undermine the credibility of 
Alliance members. In the piece, RT points out that no troops were left behind and even 
uses comments from NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg to illustrate it. Then the article 
closes by claiming that Zapad demonstrated a high level of transparency and that NATO 
is hypocritical due to it holding “massive parallel military exercises in Sweden, which 
involved almost twice as many troops as the Russian-Belarus drills and became the largest 
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military event Sweden hosted in 23 years.” 316F317  Articles disseminated by TASS also 
portrayed NATO as overreacting, Russia as concerned with security for all countries in 
Eurasia and Europe, and that NATO maintains an aggressive stance in the Baltic States and 
Central Europe.317F318 Russia also used social media such as a post to the official Twitter 
account of the Russian Embassy in the U.S. that mocked concerns regarding Zapad 2017 
and linked to a Facebook post containing Russian messaging on the exercise including that 
the West generated hysteria over Zapad in order to justify large-scale military exercises in 
the Baltic region. 318F319 
3. NATO Propaganda about Zapad 2017 
NATO public diplomacy efforts sought to stress the need for transparency in 
military exercises in Europe while also pointing out the destabilizing effect of Russia’s 
behavior. In the months after the exercise NATO information efforts countered Russia’s 
official estimate of participants and claims of transparency. NATO Secretary General 
Stoltenberg made clear to Russian representatives at a NATO–Russia Council meeting in 
late October 2017 that Zapad exceeded official Russian estimates in both geography and 
troop numbers. This message was also shared with global press. 319F320 In December a NATO 
Review article stated that “Russia has used its strategic exercises and large-scale snap 
exercises to hone its military capabilities, undermine regional stability and peace — twice, 
first in Georgia and then Ukraine — to mask impending aggression. Exercise ZAPAD 2017 
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was the latest iteration of such exercises.” 320F321 The article maintains and gives examples that 
since 2008, Russia has consistently underestimated its official troop counts in order to limit 
the presence of international observers. An investigation of Russian propaganda during 
Zapad 2017 by the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab exposed false claims 
of Russian transparency and NATO aggression. This piece provides an example of NATO 
countering Russian propaganda by using associated organizations. 321F322 This maintained 
consistency with and reinforced NATO messaging via social media before and during the 
exercise that Russia was spreading disinformation about Zapad and not being 
transparent.322F323  
B. TRIDENT JUNCTURE 2018 
1. Overview of Trident Juncture 2018 Exercise 
Trident Juncture 2018 was a NATO exercise that took place from October 25 to 
November 7, 2018. NATO members and partner nations contributed 50,000 personnel, 
10,000 vehicles, 250 planes, and 65 ships to the exercise. Norway hosted Trident Juncture 
with the exercise utilizing: Norwegian land, territorial waters, and airspace; the Norwegian 
Sea; Swedish airspace; and a part of the Baltic Sea bordered by Poland, Germany, 
Denmark, and Sweden. The purpose of Trident Juncture was to test, via an Article 5 
scenario, NATO’s ability to wage a large-scale defensive operation in the air, on land, at 
sea, and in cyberspace.323F324 This military exercise was the one of the largest ever conducted 
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in Norway and the largest one NATO has conducted in over 20 years.324F325 An exercise the 
size of Trident Juncture was important for NATO because it tested on a large scale myriad 
capabilities from planning to logistics to warfighting. The selection of Norway presented a 
challenging environment for NATO to operate in due to its rugged terrain as well as its 
range of climate and weather. In addition, it was an opportunity to see how Norway could 
handle such an influx of Alliance personnel and material and whether Norwegian civil and 
military authorities could work together efficiently to facilitate the rapid ingress and 
distribution of the Alliance reinforcements. For NATO to operate and succeed in such an 
exercise was a vital demonstration to Alliance members, partners, and to states like Russia 
that NATO has the ability and the capacity to come to the defense of an attacked NATO 
member no matter the environment. This is a critical message to send. 
2. Russian Propaganda Concerning Trident Juncture 2018 
Russian anti-NATO propaganda during the period of Trident Juncture 2018 
contained familiar themes: NATO as the aggressor, divisions within the Alliance, and that 
Russia seeks peace and is the victim of a vengeful West. Some of these themes appear in 
the same piece of propaganda to magnify the message while others focus on a single theme. 
Unsurprisingly, some of the propaganda clearly contradicts other Russian propaganda such 
as some material claiming NATO is aggressive and warmongering while other propaganda 
portrays the armed forces of the Alliance’s members as weak, poorly equipped, and even 
incompetent. 
There are numerous pieces of Russian anti-NATO propaganda focusing on Trident 
Juncture. In October 2018 RT published two articles in English relating to the exercise. 
One discussed the U.S. contribution of the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group to 
the NATO exercise and used this as a major example of how the U.S. and NATO are 
militarizing the Arctic. The piece closed by portraying Russia as the aggrieved party by 
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describing the aforementioned militarization to be occurring on “its doorstep” and that such 
actions by NATO are destabilizing the whole region. 325F326 The other article again utilizes the 
Arctic and its protentional natural resources and transport routes to frame the discussion. 
According to the propaganda, these are the reasons NATO is holding an exercise like 
Trident Juncture. The Alliance states that it is not targeting Russia, but according to RT, it 
really is as NATO seeks to seize the treasures of the Arctic and exclude Russia. 326F327 This 
propaganda theme of resource greed driving NATO aggression also appeared as an 
assertion as to why Finland, a NATO partner, participated in Trident Juncture. According 
to Russia, Finland desires Arctic territory. 327F328 A Sputnik piece from late October 2018 
described Trident Juncture as clearly anti-Russian, that NATO was not transparent in 
providing information, and that NATO behaves in an aggressive manner. The article is led 
by a photo of two U.S. M1 Abrams main battle tanks firing their main guns. 328F329  
A press release from the Russian Embassy in Norway combined the themes of 
NATO warmongering and the Alliance being a vassal of the U.S. with a purpose of causing 
division amongst Alliance members. The document portrayed the Alliance as hypocritical 
in that NATO claims to prepare to counter all threats while exercises like Trident Juncture 
make it clear NATO is focused on the fictional threat of Russia. According to the Russian 
government this is due to U.S. pressure that will harm NATO members not only by causing 
regional tensions to rise, but also by ignoring real threats like terrorism. 329F330 Other pieces of 
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Russian propaganda from this time period use similar tactics to spread division such as by 
portraying Norway as surrendering its sovereignty to the U.S. and NATO and thus 
encouraging conflict in the region. Another piece posits that readiness issues of the German 
armed forces are really caused by a German government unnerved by NATO’s 
aggressiveness towards Russia. 330F331 Yet, for all of the focus by Russian propaganda on 
NATO’s aggressiveness and the grave threat the Alliance posed to peace in the region, 
there was also Russian propaganda that depicted NATO armed forces as ill-mannered 
(troops relieving themselves in public places), undisciplined (consuming all the alcohol in 
Iceland), and incompetent (crashing vehicles and sinking a Norwegian frigate). 331F332   
3. NATO Public Diplomacy Focusing on Trident Juncture 2018 
Alliance public diplomacy concerning Trident Juncture 2018 focused on themes 
evident in other NATO information efforts such as NATO’s purpose (collective defense) 
and NATO’s values (pursuit of peace not aggression, adherence to international 
agreements, and transparency). NATO’s efforts aimed to convey these themes to 
populations of NATO countries and partner states, but also to counter Russian propaganda. 
Social media including Instagram and Twitter provided a means for NATO, 
Alliance members, and partner states to connect with the public and spread information 
regarding Trident Juncture. Numerous official Twitter accounts of NATO (@NATO, 
@NATOpress, etc.) and its personnel (@jensstoltenberg, @dylanpwhite, etc.) along with 
the official NATO Instagram account posted updates on Trident Juncture describing the 
participants, exercise areas, as well as highlighting contributions of individual nations. 
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Many of these stressed the themes of NATO’s purpose, benefits, and values. 332F333 The 
#WeAreNATO branding campaign played a prominent role with it being featured in 
dozens of posts on NATO’s Instagram account. Social media was also used to directly 
confront Russian propaganda such as the example discussed in Chapter III Figure 30.  
NATO used other means to counter Russian propaganda during Trident Juncture as 
well. A NATO webpage debunked Russian propaganda myths about the Alliance, and in 
response to the Russian claim that NATO military exercises target and threaten Russia, 
NATO reiterated that the Alliance is a defensive one. The text further pointed out NATO’s 
transparency and adherence to international agreements. 333F334 Another NATO webpage 
provided greater detail, explaining how NATO always complies with the OSCE's Vienna 
Document that requires advance notification to all OSCE members of military exercises 
involving over 9,000 personnel and observation by members of exercises with over 13,000 
personnel. 334F335 
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These two case studies show that since 2014 Russia has continued to disseminate 
anti-NATO propaganda and NATO has worked to counter it while making sure the 
Alliance’s narrative is heard. In both cases Russian propaganda sought to portray NATO 
as the true danger to security and stability in the region. The Alliance smartly continued to 
convey to the public NATO’s purpose, benefits, and values while also specifically refuting 
Russian propaganda and disinformation. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. RUSSIA’S ANTI-NATO PROPAGANDA—THE OLD AND THE NEW 
One of the two hypotheses presented in Chapter I posited that the anti-NATO 
propaganda efforts of Russia today are not a new phenomenon, but instead are a 
continuation of the USSR’s mass persuasion activities targeted against the Alliance during 
the Cold War. The comparative approach used in Chapter II demonstrated that this is 
indeed the case though unsurprisingly there are a couple of noteworthy differences that 
need to be recognized. 
Key similarities exist between the Russia’s and the USSR’s views on propaganda 
as well as in the goals and themes of anti-NATO mass persuasion efforts. Like in the Soviet 
Union, Russia today recognizes that propaganda is a valuable tool to spread its approved 
culture, ideology, and nationalism domestically thus assisting in the consolidation of power 
by Putin and his supporters. In the foreign sphere propaganda is seen as a way for Russia, 
like the Soviet Union, to rally international support and distract and divide adversaries thus 
allowing Russia to pursue and achieve its policy objectives. The goals and themes of anti-
NATO propaganda remain quite the same. The objectives are to diminish NATO’s power 
by sapping public support and dividing the Alliance members. Russia continues to use 
themes portraying NATO as aggressive, bellicose, and supporting fascism. 
Major differences between Russian and Soviet anti-NATO mass persuasion 
activities are found in the ideology driving these regimes and the means available to 
disseminate the propaganda. Both are significant. The lack of a Communist ideology grants 
the Kremlin flexibility. For example, Russia can generate propaganda with the Kremlin’s 
anti-NATO themes and pro-Russian ones that targets groups and individuals across the 
political spectrum. The advances in communications technology since the Cold War, 
particularly in the last decade, have played a major role in Russia’s propaganda campaigns 
by allowing, on a continuous basis, the Kremlin to distort the truth and distract the 
conversation in an attempt to control the narrative and influence targeted populations. 
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B. NATO’S RESPONSE TO RUSSIA’S MASS PERSUASION CHALLENGE 
The second hypothesis put forth in Chapter I stated that since 2014 the Alliance’s 
public diplomacy activities have countered Russian anti-NATO propaganda and bolstered 
NATO. Investigating NATO’s efforts sought to answer the research questions of how the 
Alliance has countered Russian mass persuasion activities and how NATO’s actions in the 
public diplomacy realm have supported the Alliance. As acknowledged in Chapter I, it is 
extremely difficult to measure the effectiveness of a piece of propaganda or even a 
campaign. However, Chapter III and Chapter IV demonstrate that NATO’s public 
diplomacy activities since 2014 have countered Russian anti-NATO propaganda while also 
bolstering the Alliance. The former chapter by its comparative nature provides the reader 
with a clear distinction between NATO’s public diplomacy today and its information 
efforts of the Cold War. This distinction lies in NATO’s countering of propaganda directed 
against the Alliance. The latter chapter provides two additional cases that show NATO 
confronting Russia mass persuasion while spreading pro-NATO messaging. 
As evidenced in Chapters III and IV, NATO has countered Russian propaganda by 
confronting it. The Alliance has not relied on the national efforts of member states but has 
itself actively engaged. NATO has done so in a number of ways. It has catalogued Russian 
myths about the Alliance and publicly refuted them. NATO leadership through various 
means have highlighted anti-NATO propaganda, called out Russia for spreading this 
misinformation, and countered it with truthful information.  
NATO’s public diplomacy actions have bolstered the Alliance and supported 
NATO’s strategy to deter Russia by promoting the Alliance to the public and also not 
allowing false Russian claims about NATO to go uncorrected. This is seen in examples 
throughout Chapters III and IV. The #WeAreNATO branding campaign has been a key 
part of informing the public about NATO and generating a positive impression of the 
Alliance. The social media aspect of this branding campaign when combined with exercises 
like Trident Juncture provide a critical opportunity for NATO to connect with the public 
in different NATO countries and partner states and to share NATO’s narrative. 
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C. NATO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY GOING FORWARD  
In order to maintain public support and stay relevant the Alliance must continue to 
engage effectively with the populations of NATO member and partner states while 
countering Russian anti-NATO propaganda. To do this NATO must continue to make 
public diplomacy a priority, cooperate in the information realm with others (member states, 
partner nations, NGOs, etc.), and, most importantly, ensure that NATO’s purpose, values, 
and benefits are clearly conveyed. 
Chapter III highlights the steps NATO has taken in the last decade to improve its 
public diplomacy. These were positive actions and NATO must continue to promote itself 
in order to ensure public awareness of the Alliance and prevent Russia from controlling the 
narrative. For example, social media provides NATO a means to engage the public while 
directly and in a timely manner (both key) confront and counter Russian anti-NATO 
propaganda. NATO must continue to measure and evaluate its public diplomacy efforts 
whether it is through polling, data analytics, or other methods in order to ensure that 
resources are devoted to activities that are producing results. As Maronkova writes “it is 
important to realize that the practice of public diplomacy and strategic communications is 
not static. It requires flexibility in searching for new and improved methods of evaluation 
and measurement. This flexibility is integral to the evolution of the outreach process.”335F336  
NATO cannot reach everyone and address all Russian propaganda by itself as the 
Alliance does not have the resources to do so. That is why cooperating with national 
information services of member states and other entities is vital. These third parties like 
the European External Action Service’s East StratCom Task Force or the Atlantic 
Council’s Digital Forensic Research can assist NATO such as by helping to identify, 
expose, and counter Russian propaganda and disinformation. The creation of NATO 
StratCom COE signified that NATO recognized the importance not only of strategic 
communications, but that cooperation in this arena, like in collective defense, is key. 
NATO must continue to be an active participant and facilitate the exchange of best 
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practices and new ideas amongst its member states, partner nations, and likeminded private 
institutions. 
Among many qualities, NATO stands for critical ones: security, democracy, 
freedom, and economic prosperity. These are powerful and appealing qualities. As noted 
in Chapter I, Paret argues that visual arts convey best the feelings and attitudes of the 
individuals and societies that created the art. Thus, NATO’s messaging should reflect the 
values of the nations it defends and the Atlantic charter that established the Alliance. 
NATO should continue devoting resources to film, images, and other visual arts to tell 
interesting, unique, and engaging stories about the Alliance in order to connect people to 
their nation’s contributions to NATO and thus link these people to the Alliance. 
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